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Abstract
Current delay- and disruption-tolerant networks are human-centric in nature, in that mobility and com-
munication tend to follow human-based characteristics, such as certain high-level mobility patterns, the
development of groups, clustering, and variance in popularity. These networks do not rely on infrastruc-
ture and hence are critical to supporting many environments including emergency response, pocket-switched,
vehicular, military, and community networks. Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of communication
protocols that work well in these environments, where resources can be heavily constrained and malicious
nodes may be present. Therefore, the goal of our work is to allow effective, efficient, and robust commu-
nication in human-centric DTNs, which we show possible by taking advantage of inherent structure found
in these networks. To accomplish this goal, and progress the state-of-the-art, we identify two categories of
research that must be enhanced: (1) supporting tools and (2) routing protocols.
Supporting tools are used for the understanding, development, and support of routing protocols, and
we consider two components for this category. First, in order to design routing protocols for human-centric
DTNs, it is critical to properly understand the environment and challenges posed by these networks. There-
fore we develop a high-level mobility model for a typical human-centric DTN: a disaster recovery network.
This model integrates the concept of different classes of nodes, referred to as roles, reacting differently
to external events. This highly-parametrized model allows exploration of many different graph-theoretic
properties of human-centric DTNs and provides a better understanding of how DTN routing protocols
can best transmit data throughout the network. Furthermore, it acts as a useful mobility tool for protocol
simulation. Second, in order to utilize the potential of group-based communication, we develop a local and
robust group-management protocol, called MembersOnly. This protocol allows nodes to quickly and accu-
rately transmit group membership information throughout the network, and is robust to malicious nodes
attempting to disrupt the process. Through analysis and simulation, it is shown that MembersOnly can
withstand multiple types of attacks, with only very limited periods of vulnerability.
The second category, routing protocols, directly allows applications to transmit data throughout the
network. Here, we consider three components. Like most networks, unicast is a fundamental and neces-
ii
sary form of communication for human-centric DTNs. Therefore, we develop a highly efficient and effec-
tive unicast protocol, called Encounter-based Routing (EBR). EBR is an intentionally resource-friendly
protocol that excels in the resource-constrained environments of human-centric DTNs through intelligent
replication based on inherent network structure. We show that EBR can achieve up to a 40% improve-
ment in message delivery over current state-of-the-art, while achieving up to a 145% increase in goodput.
Next, due to structure inherent in many human-centric DTNs, group-based communication can be a nat-
ural and powerful form of communication. Therefore, to support group-based communication, we present
an overarching, protocol-independent way to enhance current unicast protocols, giving them the ability
to perform anycast. This enhancement can be done in a thin shim beneath the routing layer, allowing the
unicast protocols to run unmodified. Through evaluation, we show how different parameters and network
conditions affect anycast performance, and how these differ from unicast. Finally, to allow highly flexible
group-based communication, we explore manycast in DTNs. First, we thoroughly analyze the difficulty of
varying manycast requests, deepening our understanding of how replication should change as the request
becomes more or less difficult. Second, we show via simulation that an effective manycast protocol must
dynamically change its replication strategy on a per-message basis. Third, we present a manycast meta-
protocol, which dynamically selects an appropriate low-level protocol based on the current request and
network conditions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The ubiquitous availability of wireless communication has pushed researchers from looking at relatively
connected ad-hoc networks to frequently disconnected delay- and disruption-tolerant networks (DTNs).
These networks, characterized by intermittent connectivity and heavy partitioning, generally cannot rely
on supporting infrastructure, leaving them at the mercy of the individual ad-hoc nodes to transmit data [26].
The key benefit to these networks is their ability to enable communication without having to assume the
presence of infrastructure. For this reason, DTNs are critical to supporting emergency response networks [34],
pocket-switched social networks [13], vehicular networks [10], military or battlefield networks, third-world
development networks [26], and community networks (which include a composition of vehicular networks,
pedestrian networks, and potentially stationary access-points) [16]. There are many reasons why infras-
tructure should not be assumed in these environments. First, infrastructure many not be available at all,
as is often the case in emergency response or battlefield networks, and hence the only way to communicate
is to utilize opportunistic contacts between nodes in the network. Second, even if infrastructure is avail-
able, it may be either too costly or too inconvenient. For instance, user-created mobile networks may be
a free alternative to costly cellular networks. Furthermore, DTNs may be a much faster way to commu-
nicate with friends, since many 3G cellular networks are frequently overloaded, severely degrading perfor-
mance.
An interesting characteristic for many DTNs, including the ones listed above, is that their mobility and
communication patterns tend to follow human-based characteristics, such as certain high-level mobility
patterns, the development of groups, clustering, and variance in popularity [13, 16, 49]. These human-
centric DTNs are particularly interesting, since wireless-enabled mobile devices are becoming pervasive,
and advances in wireless vehicular technology are increasing. However, there are currently many tech-
nological issues involving communication that must be addressed before these networks can experience
wide-spread use. In particular, we believe there are two fundamental issues that are hindering the use of
these networks. First, there is a lack of effective unicast routing protocols that work well even in resource-
constrained environments. Since many DTN environments are created from mobile devices, resources such
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as battery life, bandwidth, buffer space, and contact duration cannot be assumed to be plentiful, as many
current DTN unicast protocols do [32, 4, 10, 55]. Unfortunately, the ones designed for resource-constrained
environments are not as effective as they should be [51]. Second, since current DTNs are human-centric in
nature, group-based communication is natural and should be enabled. The ability to form, propagate, and
reconcile group information, even in the generally untrustworthy DTN environment, is necessary for crit-
ical forms of communication. This includes anycast, where the goal is to reach at least one member of a
particular group, and manycast, where the goal is to reach at least k members of a particular group, where
k can vary between requests. Group-based communication has not been practically considered for DTNs,
which is hindering their wide-spread use.
Of the many potential environments suitable for DTNs, we choose two examples to illustrate the im-
portance of our stated goals. First, consider an emergency response scenario where primary infrastructure,
such as centralized cellular services, are either down (e.g., destroyed) or unusable (e.g., overloaded) [35].
Since it is likely that many of the people will be carrying wireless devices, an impromptu DTN fits this
scenario perfectly, and offers the best, and probably only, solution for communication. Unicast is clearly
important, since there will be many messages inquiring and responding to inquires about the well-being of
specific people, as well as fine-grained communication between emergency responders. In addition, group-
based communication will be critical, since people are naturally divided into role-based groups. A civil-
ian is likely to attempt to enlist the help of any emergency responder, as opposed to a specific one. Simi-
larly, police officers are likely to request the service of any ambulance, or any k ambulances, as opposed to
specific ones. Note that this scenario presents numerous resource-related challenges, such as limited bat-
tery life, buffer space, bandwidth, and contact duration, as well as the potential presence of untrustworthy
nodes.
As a second example, consider a community DTN network consisting of pedestrians, cars (e.g., a ve-
hicular network), buses, stationary access points, etc [16]. In many areas, a DTN is preferred to cellular
services, for numerous reasons. First, it will likely be free, as opposed to cellular networks. Second, cur-
rent cellular networks are heavily overloaded resulting in degraded performance. A free alternative for rel-
atively short-range communication presents an attractive option. Third, many areas around the world are
not covered by cellular networks at all. DTNs working in all of these environments must support unicast,
since most current applications require it and the desire for direct communication between two specific
nodes is not likely to vanish in the near future. However, there are many useful scenarios for group-based
anycast. As buses become equipped with Internet-able gateways, individual cars on the road would have
incentive to contact any bus or stationary access point, instead of a specific one, for its gateway capabil-
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ity. Furthermore, pedestrians may be more interested in using the network to call any cab as opposed to
a specific one. Like before, many resources will be highly constrained, posing challenges to routing pro-
tocols. Hand-held devices may be constrained by battery life and buffer space, whereas cars may be con-
strained by contact duration.
Our key observation is that, while communication is more difficult in DTNs than traditional ad-hoc
networks, many scenarios suitable for DTNs, particularly human-centric DTNs, exhibit a high degree of
both mobility, social, and communication structure. Communication protocols should be aware of and
work cooperatively with this structure, instead of being oblivious to it. We therefore leverage this struc-
ture and work with it to allow communication to be effective, in that there are high-delivery ratios and
low end-to-end delays, efficient, in that they are resource-friendly and perform well in resource-constrained
environments, and robust, in that they are, to some level, resistant to attacks in untrustworthy or mali-
cious environments.
1.1 Necessary Components and Research Contributions
The goal of this thesis is to allow effective, efficient, and robust communication in DTNs, including unicast
and anycast. We particularly focus on human-centric DTNs, where structure can be leveraged. In order to
accomplish this goal, we identify two categories that must be enhanced: (1) supporting tools and (2) rout-
ing protocols. Supporting tools are used for the understanding, development, and support of routing pro-
tocols, and we consider two components that fall under this category. First, it is necessary to understand
the graph-theoretic characteristics of human-centric DTNs, as well as the challenges they pose, in order to
understand how communication protocols react to and can be effective in these environments. Along these
lines, it is necessary to have human-centric DTN mobility models for which to evaluate routing protocols.
Second, in order to enable the communication potential provided by inherent group structure in these net-
works, local and robust group management must be enabled. This allows group information to quickly
propagate throughout the network, and be accurate even if many nodes are untrustworthy, and opens the
door for group-based communication. The second category is the development of actual routing protocols,
which are the protocols that directly interact with the application. Here, we consider three components.
First, unicast routing must be enabled for resource-constrained DTNs, since the vast majority of DTNs
are, to some degree lacking resources. Unicast is a fundamental routing paradigm that many applications
rely on. Second, building off of the group management, group-based communication, particularly anycast,
must be developed. Finally, in order to generalize group-based communication, manycast in a DTN set-
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ting is explored. This includes understanding how the fundamental difficulty of a k of m manycast request
changes as k changes, and how replication rate must adjust. While some of these components have been
briefly studied in literature, none has been studied to the extent required for wide-spread use.
1.1.1 Understanding the Environment: Mobility in Structured DTNs
As a prerequisite to developing communication protocols, it is necessary to fully understand the environ-
ment in which these protocols operate. Therefore, developing high-level mobility models for structured
DTNs that are generic enough to explore a large mobility space is critical to both better understanding as
well as having better tools to evaluate proposed routing solutions. First, understanding how movement oc-
curs in DTN environments, such as disaster recovery networks, helps guide routing decisions such as how
often replication should occur, when replication should occur, and to whom replication should occur. This
guidance comes from graph-theoretic properties of these networks, such as how clustering coefficient and
average node density vary throughout the different locations in the network. Second, high-level, generic
mobility models act as an invaluable tool for evaluating proposed routing protocols in their target environ-
ments. Since real-life experimentation is often time-consuming, costly, and difficult to reproduce, realistic
DTN mobility models provide an excellent simulation-based environment in which to evaluate communica-
tion protocols.
To respond to this challenge, we have developed a high-level mobility model for disaster recovery net-
works, a popular scenario exhibiting DTN behavior. Taking a highly parametrized approach, the model
is capable of simulating a wide range of movement, where nodes assume roles, such as civilian, police offi-
cer, and ambulance, and, depending on the role, react differently to different global events in the network.
Different roles cluster and move in an intuitive fashion, giving insight into how communication protocols
should best route information. This model, along with other mobility models for different DTN scenarios,
acts as a tool for us to explore communication protocols and analyze their effectiveness.
1.1.2 Local and Robust Group Management
Although many current applications rely heavily on unicast, an equally if not more important paradigm is
group-based communication. Groups are naturally found in many environments, and are especially com-
mon in human-centric DTNs where much of the communication and mobility is based on human interac-
tion [13, 23, 49]. In these environments, the composition of groups may be based on many different ab-
stractions, including roles [35], social networks [13], or geographical closeness. Unfortunately, due to the
intermittently connected nature of DTNs, maintaining and disseminating such group information is chal-
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lenging, especially in the presence of malicious attackers. The successful enhancement of DTN communi-
cation through the use of group information requires that nodes throughout the network be aware of the
membership lists for all groups. While such group membership management is not difficult in connected
environments, heavy partitioning and the lack of readily available end-to-end paths in DTNs break cen-
tralized membership services, just like they break traditional routing [26].
In response to this challenge, we developed a robust group information management protocol called
MembersOnly. MembersOnly allows groups to accurately distribute membership lists to nodes through-
out the network without the use of cryptography, and is robust to multiple malicious nodes attempting to
alter these lists. We show that it can protect against many types of membership list altering attacks. In
addition, we show that even the most basic anycast routing protocols can gain a significant advantage in
hostile environments by using MembersOnly.
1.1.3 Unicast Communication
The staple of communication in current networks is unicast, where one node attempts to communicate
with another specific node. It is therefore of the utmost importance that efficient unicast protocols be de-
veloped for human-centric DTNs before wide-spread adoption can occur. Many current DTN routing pro-
tocols are resource-heavy since they attempt to overcome the intermittent connectivity with large amounts
of message replication, in hopes that at least one message copy will reach the destination [4, 10, 32, 55].
Unfortunately, in many human-centric DTNs, resources such as battery life, contact duration, bandwidth,
and even storage space are limited and these flooding-based protocols quickly overwhelm them, having a
severe negative impact on performance metrics. The few protocols that attempt to be resource friendly
generally suffer in either message delivery ratio or end-to-end latency due to missing important contact
opportunities [51]. It is necessary for unicast protocols to be both effective in terms of performance met-
rics, while being efficient in terms of resources.
To meet this challenge, we developed a highly efficient and effective unicast routing protocol for DTNs
that excels in resource-constrained environments, called Encounter-Based Routing, or EBR. By taking ad-
vantage of inherent network structure, it is able to achieve a significant performance advantage over exist-
ing protocols, particularly in resource-constrained environments.
1.1.4 Anycast Communication
As previously mentioned, group-based communication is an important paradigm for human-centric DTNs,
and enabling group-based communication is critical towards progressing their wide-spread use. In these
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environments, group-based communication is central and hence a natural and useful routing paradigm is
anycast, where a node attempts to communicate with at least one member of a particular group. Anycast
is useful in DTNs both as a stand alone paradigm [20], when contacting any member of a particular group
is sufficient, as well as enabling smarter unicast paradigms [25]. In connected environments, basic any-
cast routing techniques are relatively straightforward, as messages can be unicast to a particular node in
the group that has the lowest cost. This technique, however, does not work in disconnected environments,
since it is extremely difficult to predict which of the nodes of the group would even get the message, let
alone get it the quickest. The disconnected and unpredictable environment indicates that anycast must
instead be smarter and attempt to truly reach any node in the group. Unfortunately, there are very few
anycast solutions for disconnected environments, and of these almost all are based on single-copy routing
or work only in highly constrained mobility patterns.
To address this pressing need, we have developed a protocol-independent technique to enhance many
existing unicast protocols and allow them to perform anycast. This enhancement can be done in a thin
shim inserted beneath the routing layer, and hence unicast protocols can run unmodified above it. Through
an exhaustive set of simulations, we evaluate how different parameters and network conditions affect the
performance of these newly transformed anycast protocols.
1.1.5 Manycast Communication
In order to capture the full power of group-based communication, we must introduce and explore the most
general paradigm - manycast. The goal of manycast is to reach at least k members of a group of size m.
This paradigm includes anycast (when k = 1) as well as multicast (when k = m). Fundamentally un-
derstanding the difficulty of a manycast request, as well as developing a routing framework to handle it,
is beneficial for a few reasons. First, it deepens our theoretical knowledge of the relative difficulty of any-
cast, unicast, and multicast, which can help guide replication decisions. Second, it allows applications a
high degree of flexibility to express their wishes. Group-based applications where anycast, unicast, and
multicast are not sufficient and/or efficient may include reaching a statistically significant sample of sen-
sor networks, requesting at least k emergency response vehicles in a disaster zone, and contacting k local
friends for social multiplayer gaming.
In response to this need, we have conducted a thorough exploration of manycast in DTN environ-
ments. To conduct this exploration, we took a three-pronged approach. First, the relative difficulty of
manycast requests was quantified via analysis. Second, extensive simulations were performed to under-
stand how existing classes of protocols handle varying manycast requests. This has shown that effective
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DTN manycast protocols must dynamically react on a per-message basis by drastically changing their
routing approach. Finally, we developed a manycast meta-protocol capable of dynamically switching be-
tween low-level protocols based on the current request and network conditions.
1.1.6 Thesis Structure
In Chapter 2, we describe our role-based, event-driven mobility model for disaster recovery networks. Chap-
ter 3 presents our group-management protocol that helps open the door for group-based communication.
Chapter 4 presents our highly efficient unicast routing protocol. In Chapter 5, we describe an overarching
technique to enhance current unicast protocols, giving them the ability to perform anycast. Chapter 6 de-
scribes our exploration of manycast and presents a dynamic manycast meta-protocol. Finally, we conclude
and present future directions in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Event–driven, Role–based Mobility
One of the most important tools in understanding the complex characteristics of DTNs is simulation.
While many mobility models exist for simulating ad-hoc networks, they do not realistically capture the be-
havior of objects in disaster scenarios. In this chapter, we propose a high level event- & role-based mobil-
ity paradigm in which objects’ movement patterns are caused by environmental events. The introduction
of roles allows different objects to uniquely and realistically react to events. For instance some roles, such
as civilian, may flee from events, whereas other roles, such as police, may be attracted to events. Further-
more, to incorporate reaction from multiple events in a realistic fashion, we propose a low-level gravity-
based mobility model in which events apply forces to objects. Simulation results show that our disaster
mobility paradigm coupled with our gravitational mobility model creates a network topology that differs
from the popular Random Walk mobility model. This new disaster mobility model opens up the door for
more realistic simulation of communication and routing protocols for disaster recovery networks.
2.1 Disaster Recovery Networks
Much of the recent interest in delay tolerant networks has come from the need to support communication
for organizations like police and fire departments, as well as other first responders. The behavior of most
of these organizations is driven by the need to respond to events and participate in those events based
on the particular role of the organization. Since this type of behavior is very specific to emergency and
disaster response scenarios, understanding communication patterns in such networks is critical to under-
standing how to improve the current state of emergency response. However, current mobility models for
wireless networks do not capture the complexity of either the behavior of the different components of such
networks or the specifics of the expected communication patterns. Realistic mobility and communication
models can enable more effective evaluation via simulation and eventually lead to more effective solutions.
One of the biggest challenges faced by communication in disaster recovery networks comes from the
high expectation of network partitions and dynamic object behavior. The high potential for object fail-
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ure further complicates matters. Intuition says that, as objects react differently to different events, the
variance in density of the communication graph will change and cause strain on current routing protocols.
Due to this unique behavior, disaster recovery networks present challenging environments.
One of the fundamental aspects of simulating disaster recovery networks is realistically modeling the
movement patterns of the mobile objects. Modeling mobility enables testing the effectiveness of current
routing protocols as well as provides insight into how routing protocols can be improved. In a disaster en-
vironment, it presents unique challenges in that environmental events and roles directly affect a node’s
movement patterns. Intuitively, events act as stimuli for mobile nodes in the network, causing them to re-
act in ways according to the predefined roles they take on. Many roles in disaster networks must react to
multiple events by fleeing or approaching in a realistic fashion.
Many ad-hoc network mobility models have been developed and analyzed [11, 5, 15, 27, 31, 43]. Mod-
els based on random movement are particularly popular and heavily studied [6, 7, 47, 21]. These models,
while adequate to study environments for which they were designed, do not allow for groups of objects to
react differently to environmental events. Therefore, a higher-level, more general mobility model is needed
to incorporate the different roles objects play in disaster scenarios.
In this chapter, we present an event- & role-based mobility paradigm that effectively characterizes the
movement patterns of objects in a disaster scenario. Different sets of these patterns are embedded into
different object roles. Attaching actions to roles and not directly to objects has the advantage that move-
ment patterns are organized and objects can quickly shift from one pattern to another by assuming differ-
ent roles. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first disaster mobility paradigm that is reactive, in a
role-based fashion, to environmental events and their associated parameters.
The main contribution of our research in this chapter is the classification of a generic event- & role-
based mobility paradigm that completely defines movement patterns given a series of environmental events
for a set of characteristic roles. Additionally, we present a low-level physics-based gravitational mobility
model that “plugs in” to our event-driven, role-based paradigm allowing objects to react to the presence
of numerous disaster events based on the particular role of the node. This allows objects to flee from or
approach multiple, unrelated events. To evaluate the effect of our comprehensive model on communication
patterns in disaster recovery networks, we discuss a new set of relevant metrics that help characterize the
changes in topology as disaster events unfold. Finally, we have developed a set of tools to realistically con-
struct a mobility scenario and trace files of our disaster mobility model for the ns2 network simulator [1].
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2.2 Modeling Object Behavior
Modeling the movement behavior of mobile objects has been heavily studied. Due to its simplicity and
effectiveness, the Random Walk [21] model is widely used to model such object behavior. In this model,
a node randomly chooses a direction in [0, 2pi) along with a speed, and moves according to those choices
for a set amount of time. After this time has expired, the node repeats the process. A recent model by
Jardosh et al. [27] takes polygon-shaped objects into account by using Voronoi diagrams to build walks.
While many of these models are adequate for their particular environments, all objects generally act in
the same way and, therefore, do not give the flexibility required for modeling disaster scenarios. This is
because real people and vehicles take on roles, allowing them to react to events in a distinct fashion.
Mobility in disaster recovery scenarios is fundamentally driven by environmental events. These events
act as stimuli towards objects and directly cause them to change their movement patterns. While some
current models, including [27], could be extended to react to external stimuli, truly capturing the com-
plex interactions between more than one environmental event requires building new mobility models with
event-driven actions as the primitive concept. Furthermore, while all objects react to relevant events, dif-
ferent classes of objects react in different ways. In other words, object behavior changes over time and is
not uniform across all nodes. Objects also must react to multiple events in a realistic and smooth fashion.
There is currently no adequate mobility model that takes into account these observations.
To illustrate this idea with an example, consider an apartment fire in a populated neighborhood. There
are, intuitively, at least three different classes of behavior that objects can assume: (1) fleeing from the
event, as is the case with civilians, (2) approaching the event with the intent of staying, as is the case with
police and firefighters, and (3) oscillating from event to a predetermined location, as is the case with am-
bulances. These high-level behavior classes, which we refer to as roles, help give general but clear mobility
patterns, which are realistic and relatively easy to simulate.
Roles, however, need not be limited to specifying movement patterns during a disaster scenario. It is
easy to extend the concept of a role to cause an object to react differently during different stages of an
event. For example, cleanup crews may want to react to disaster events by approaching them long after
the event has occurred, whereas police may instead want to approach the event immediately.
In response to the need for unique behavior modeling in disaster scenarios, we have developed a high-
level, role-based, event-driven mobility paradigm in which different roles take on different mobility pat-
terns in reaction to specific events. Our paradigm is high level in the sense that an object may take on
multiple mobility patterns over the course of some time period. For instance, a civilian may first be mod-
eled by Random Walk. After some time, an event, such as a fire, may trigger the civilian to change its
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model to one of fleeing from the fire. By modeling mobility as a series of event-driven, role-based actions,
we can properly select which specific mobility model to use for a given object and situation. While the
specific rules for reaction should be based on observational studies, our paradigm is sufficiently general
enough to allow future, accurate movement patterns to be used.
Our paradigm allows for different objects to react to events in unique ways by attaching a mobility
pattern for each possible (event, role) combination. These lower level mobility patterns can be any of the
previously developed mobility models, including Random Walk. To further illustrate the behavior of cer-
tain roles in a disaster scenario, we have developed a low level physics-based gravitational model that al-
lows objects to flee or approach disaster events in an intuitively realistic fashion. It is important to note
that our high level, event- & role-based paradigm is not tied to the gravitational model in any way, and
can support any of the previously defined low level mobility models.
Our gravitational model captures the effect-distance relationship between events and objects, allowing
events to act on objects via forces. Objects closer to events are affected more than objects farther away.
Additionally, each event has an event horizon, defined as the maximum distance at which an event affects
objects, which allows events to have a defined radius of effect. Finally, there is a communication threshold,
which defines the time until emergency vehicles are notified of an event. Until this time, emergency vehi-
cles outside the event horizon do not respond to the event; however, after the threshold time has passed,
those emergency vehicles begin to converge on the event. It is possible that multiple events could take
place in a single scenario. Additionally, these events may or may not be simultaneous. One of the major
benefits of the gravitational model is that it easily captures the interactions between multiple events.
The classification of behavior into roles can also play a part in establishing realistic communication
patterns. For instance, civilians are most likely in contact only with police and other civilians, police are
in contact with all roles, firefighters are in contact with police and other firefighters, and ambulances are
in contact with police. These communication patterns, along with the mobility, can simplistically model
an entire disaster scenario. For this chapter, however, we concentrate solely on modeling mobility,
2.3 Disaster Mobility Paradigm
In this section, we formally describe our high-level mobility paradigm that incorporates external, environ-
mental events along with role-based reaction. By partitioning objects into roles, which define their reac-
tions to events, our paradigm can realistically obtain a set of (role, event, action) triples that define the
overall movement patterns of objects in disaster recovery scenarios. A single triple can be read as follows:
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“Role r reacts to event e by taking action a”. Then, by instantiating the triples with the characteristics
for different agents operating in a disaster scenario, a mobility pattern can be generated for the scene.
Three entities, and their relationships to one another, help define our high level mobility paradigm:
objects, roles, and events. Objects are nodes in the system that provide movement and communication.
Each object assumes a role, or set of roles, that indicate what movement pattern the object should assume
in response to external stimuli. The specific areas of interest that provide external stimuli to objects are
referred to as events. The event-based response a role dictates to an object is an action, which is generally
a low-level mobility model, such as Random Walk or the gravitational model presented in Section 2.4.1.
We now elaborate on these three entities and their relationships to one another.
Objects are the critical components of the scenario, including people, buildings, and vehicles, and are
defined by the following parameters:
• Location: The (x,y,z) location of the object.
• Role: The role, or set of roles, associated with the object.
• Velocity: The current velocity of the object (in vector form).
Roles dictate how objects react to events. We define four main categories of roles, although it is possi-
ble to define any number of them. First, the repelling category causes objects to be repelled from events.
The low-level mobility models that support this role should allow objects to move away from events in a
realistic and easy-to-use fashion. The most common use of this role is to model normal civilians in a dis-
aster scenario. An attribute of this role is curiosity, which dictates how likely it is for an object to stop
at the event horizon, simulating curious on-lookers. Second, the attraction role causes objects to converge
on events. Low-level mobility models that support this role should cause objects to quickly approach an
event or events. Common uses of this role are to model police and firefighters. Third, the oscillating role
models objects that first approach an event and then, upon reaching the event, travel immediately to a
predefined location. This movement pattern is then repeated continuously. Low-level mobility models that
support this role should allow this action to be as realistic as possible. One use of this role is to model an
emergency response system in which ambulances oscillate between the event and a hospital. Finally, the
immobile role models any object that remains stationary for the duration of the simulation or until the
object takes on a new role. This role can be supported by the lack of a low-level mobility model, since it
does not perform any movement. This role is useful to model both naturally static objects, such as hospi-
tals, as well as event-caused immobility.
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We anticipate that the default action dictated by many roles is Random Walk, since it simply models
motion when movement patterns are unknown or seem random. It is important to note, however, that any
mobility pattern, such as one that accounts for navigating around buildings or objects, can be used.
Events act as the stimuli for mobility changes in the scenario. In a real disaster scenario, an object’s
proximity to an event is a major factor in how it reacts. Therefore, it is important to clearly mark distinct
areas of an event. Our paradigm captures this type of behavior by defining the Disaster Radius, the Event
Horizon, and the Relevant Radius. Reaction to an event is also dependent on time, which is modeled by
the Start Time and the Radio Contact Time. The following defines the full set of parameters for an event.
• Location: The (x,y,z) location of the event.
• Start Time: Time when the event occurs.
• End Time: Time when the event ends.
• Radio Contact Time: Time when radio contact outside of the event horizon occurs.
• Disaster Radius: Area inside which all objects become immobile.
• Event Horizon: Area inside which all objects react to the event, even before radio contact occurs.
• Relevant Radius: Area inside which objects, based on their role, react to the event after radio con-
tact occurs, assuming they are not already reacting. Some roles, such as the civilian role, may not
react when inside this radius but outside the event horizon.
• Intensity: A numeric representation of the event’s current intensity.
2.4 A Disaster Mobility Model
With the high-level disaster mobility paradigm formalized, we now describe a disaster mobility model that
we believe intuitively models simple disaster scenarios. For implementation purposes, we have made some
simplifying assumptions. First, we assume events are stationary, have a constant intensity, and, after their
start, persist for the remainder of the simulation. Furthermore, objects assume a single initial role and do
not change it for the duration of the simulation, unless changing to the immobile role. Finally, all roles
except the Immobile role default to the Random Walk action. At the end of this section, we discuss how
to capture events that are mobile and change intensity, as well as events that are not best represented by
a single point.
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2.4.1 Gravitational Model
Intuitively, many roles react to disaster events by either fleeing from or approaching them. To model these
actions in the presence of multiple events, we use a physics-based gravitational model to define the “Flee”
and “Approach” actions. Gravitation has been used to model group mobility dynamics, particularly in [48],
but not event-based mobility. We designed this model based on the observation that objects, in general,
either gravitate towards or away from disaster events.
Physics states that the gravitational force between two objects with masses m1 and m2 at a distance d
from each other is:
F =
G ·m1 ·m2
d2
where G is the gravitational constant. The total resulting vector force on an object in the vicinity of mul-
tiple objects is calculated by the vector sum of all forces on the object. The resulting force directly affects
the object’s acceleration.
We borrow the concepts of gravity and force from physics to model the flee and approach actions. By
letting m2 be the “mass” of a given event, and assuming m1 is negligible, the force on an object by that
event can be described as F = I/d2, where I, the intensity, encompasses G and m2. Mobile objects can
then be repelled or attracted to events (or multiple events) by assigning a particular intensity to every
event.
To calculate the motion trajectories of objects as a result of multiple forces, we sway from physics
slightly to allow for a more intuitively realistic movement pattern. Physics states that forces directly affect
an object’s acceleration. However, humans are more concerned with maintaining a particular velocity at a
given time than maintaining a particular acceleration. We generally do not maintain a constant accelera-
tion, but rather accelerate quickly to a desired velocity and then hold an acceleration of zero. Therefore,
it is intuitively more correct to say that humans will adjust their speed, not their acceleration, according to
how far they are from a disaster event (of course, they will adjust their acceleration to obtain that speed,
but only for a short period of time). Therefore, in our gravitational model, forces act directly on velocity,
not acceleration, to account for this phenomenon. The benefit of taking a gravitational-based approach to
model mobility is that it allows the reaction of objects to be intuitive and easy to compute for multiple,
unsynchonized, dynamic events.
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2.4.2 Disaster Model
Let M be the set of (role, event, action) triples that define our mobility model. M is populated by adding
triples to cover all components or the desired scenario. All mobile nodes initially start using the Random
Walk Model to either walk or drive, with speeds appropriately bounded. Formally, there are a set of initial
(role, event, action) triples for each role as follows:
{(r, No Event, Random Walk) : r ∈ R},
where R is the set of all possible roles. The “No Event” event is simply the default event every role as-
sumes when there are no relevant events in the network.
If a disaster event occurs, two areas are immediately formed. The first area is ground-zero, as defined
by the disaster area parameter, within which objects are immediately immobilized. We model this by sim-
ply immobilizing all nodes within a set radius of the disaster event. We formally model this by the inclu-
sion of the following triples into M :
{(r, DE1 - At Ground-Zero, Switch to Immobile) : r ∈ R}
The “DE1 - At Ground-Zero” event is a disaster event (with the label ”DE1” representing disaster
event #1) that has occurred when the object was within the disaster radius of the event. Once an object
is immobile, it stays immobile for the remainder of the simulation. To accomplish this, the action “Switch
to Immobile” instructs the object to immediately switch roles to the “Immobile” role. This role is defined
in M as follows:
(Immobile, No Event, Stay Still)
It is important to note that this should be the only entry for the immobile role, since it should always de-
fault to staying still. Static objects, such as a hospital, are also assigned the immobile role.
The second area is defined by the event horizon. All objects within the event horizon react to the event
by either gravitating towards it or fleeing from it, at a speed dependent on the object’s proximity to the
event. The inclusion of a set of triples into M formally models this phenomenon. For instance, the follow-
ing triples define the area within the event horizon for a simple disaster scenario:
(Civilian, DE1 - In Event Horizon, Flee)
(Police, DE1 - In Event Horizon, Approach)
(Firefighter, DE1 - In Event Horizon, Approach)
(Ambulance, DE1 - In Event Horizon, Oscillate)
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The event “DE1 - In Event Horizon” event refers to the situation that the object is within the event
horizon radius of a disaster event. Notice that while all the events beginning with “DE1” are technically
the same event, to incorporate proximity into the action taken by a role, we break the event into multiple
areas (or regions), in which roles reacting to the same event may respond differently based on which area
of the event they are in.
After the radio contact time of the event expires, the relevant radius of the event is formed. Roles with
radio contact in this region, but outside the event horizon, should react to the event. Continuing from the
previous example, the following tuples in M formally define this area:
(Police, DE1 - In Relevant Radius, Approach)
(Firefighter, DE1 - In Relevant Radius, Approach)
(Ambulance, DE1 - In Relevant Radius, Oscillate)
An object may have multiple applicable triples at any given instance. This would occur, for example, if
a civilian were in the radii of two different events. Our gravitational model easily accommodates scenarios
of this type.
It is possible to extend our model to account for events of different shapes and sizes, as well as mobile
events. Currently, events provide forces from a central point within the event, and have different radii that
allow for a circular (or spherical) shape. Elongated event shapes, such as floods, can be simulated by plac-
ing multiple events close to each other at varying intensities. Furthermore, there is nothing prohibiting the
changing of intensity or location of an event, as forces can be quickly recomputed at every object’s loca-
tion based only on current information. The natural memoryless computation of forces allows for highly
dynamic events.
2.5 Analyzing Mobility Models
The benefits of an effective mobility model come from its ability to capture and expose the characteristics
of the network and the behavior of nodes in the network. This information can then be used by network
designers to understand how to design protocols that are suitable for the specific scenarios. In this section,
we first discuss the metrics necessary to describe network behavior in disaster scenarios. Although most
evaluations focus on simple network characteristics, such as node density and path length, the unique
behavior of nodes in a disaster scenario results in more interesting network conditions that require us to
look at more complex parameters, such as average node density and partitioning. We then present a set
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of tools that we implemented to generate ns2 mobility scenario files. In the next section, we present our
evaluation of a number of these metrics using our tools.
2.5.1 Metrics
When discussing mobility models, it is important to understand how a model affects different topological
network metrics. Two standard metrics are average node density and average path length. Average node
density, as defined by the average number of neighbors per node, can be used to help characterize the po-
tential connectivity of a network, since a network with low density will likely be partitioned. Average path
length, as defined by the average number of hops from source to destination, captures the distance be-
tween sources and destinations. However, due to the highly dynamic nature of networks under disaster
scenarios, it is important to not only consider these metrics but also those that show how the structure of
the network progresses over time. For an event-driven, role-based mobility model, the following network
parameters highlight how the network is changing over time.
• Partitioning over Time: The average path length metric is meaningless when the graph is parti-
tioned, which is likely in many disaster scenarios. Therefore, tracking whether or not the graph is
partitioned is critical to understanding the flux in network topology.
• Clustering Coefficient over Time: The clustering coefficient of a particular node is the number of
that node’s neighbors that are connected to each other divided by the total possible links between
them [58]. The higher the value of this metric, the more clustered the graph is.
• Average Node Density over Time: Although node density is an important metric, in an event-driven
mobility model, it is important to capture how density changes in reaction to different events, which
indicates churn.
• Maximum Node Density over Time: Maximum node density gives insight into the potential cluster
sizes, which can provide insight into potential bottlenecks. Although it would be useful to track ac-
tual cluster sizes, maximum node density provides a much cheaper, though quite effective, heuristic.
• Variance of Node Density over Time: Since some parts of the network may be more stable than oth-
ers, the variance in node density gives insight into the amount of variance in cluster sizes as a result
of different events.
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2.5.2 Tools
To evaluate the impact of our model on the metrics described above, we have implemented two tools for
the ns2 simulator. The first tool is a parameters file generator that creates a properly formatted parame-
ters file appropriately choosing random values when necessary. This tool prompts the user for the follow-
ing input: size of the network (in terms of meters squared), number of civilians, number of ambulances,
and number of police. Since both the police and firefighter roles are similar, we have chosen to omit fire-
fighters and simply add more police to simulate firefighters. However, it is quite simple to include firefight-
ers, or other responders, and give them appropriate behaviors. The output parameters file contains the
following information:
• Grid size and simulation runtime
• Randomized coordinates for all objects and events, and coordinates for four hospitals located at the
corners of the grid
• Minimum and maximum speeds for objects
• Percentage of curious civilians
• Random Walk parameters
• Randomized trigger times and radio contact times for four events
• Randomized intensities for events, which determine radii for event horizons and damage zones
The specific parameters generated for the experiments in this chapter are detailed in Section 2.6.1. For
any given input, this tool produces unique output since many parameters are randomly chosen. Usage for
this tool is as follows:
Usage: paramGen > paramFile.
The second tool is our main event-driven simulator. This tool accepts as input the parameters file gen-
erated by the first tool and runs a complete simulation with knowledge of Random Walk and our physics-
based gravitational model. It is important to note, however, that any mobility model can be plugged into
the tool in place of Random Walk and/or the gravitational model. The output of this tool is an ns2-compatible
mobility trace file that gives the current velocity and destination of every object at every second in the
simulation. All of the mobility model logic is performed in this tool. For any given input, the output of
this tool again produces unique output, since Random Walks performed by objects not reacting to events
may differ from one simulation to the next. Usage for this tool is as follows:
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Usage: disasterSim [-d] < paramFile > nsMobilityTrace.
The -d flag, when passed, displays each individual step of the simulation via “ASCII art” to the console.
This is printed to standard error, so it is not written to the nsMobilityTrace file.
2.6 Simulation Results & Analysis
To analyze the difference in network topology changes generated by our disaster recovery mobility model,
we generated numerous topologies and ran simulations with them using ns2. Using the same initial setups,
in terms of node placement and numbers, we ran the simulations using the Random Walk model for com-
parison. In this section, we present results from 10 different sets of simulations, each with its own group of
both deterministically and randomly chosen parameters. Each of the metrics presented in Section 2.5.1 are
evaluated for each of the resulting sets of trace files. Sufficient numbers of experiments were run to mini-
mize the 95% confidence interval.
For this chapter, we were only interested in the mobility patterns of objects in a disaster scenario and
the topological affects the patterns have on the network graph. Therefore, we did not simulate communi-
cation between nodes. However, we did specify the communication range to be 150 meters to obtain infor-
mation about links in the network.
2.6.1 Simulation Parameters
The simulation time runs from 0 to 1500 seconds with a grid size of 1000 m2. The communication range
of every node is 150 m to simulate an urban environment. There are 75 civilians, 10 ambulances, and 15
police each randomly located. A total of 90% of civilians, randomly chosen, are considered curious, mean-
ing they stop at event horizons to look at the event. Furthermore, we have chosen a minimum and maxi-
mum speed of 1 m/s and 4 m/s respectively for civilians, and 17 m/s and 20 m/s for ambulances and po-
lice. All Random Walks are done for 30 seconds.
Four events are randomly placed on the grid. The first event occurs randomly between 100 and 200
seconds, the second between 125 and 225 seconds, the third between 150 and 250 seconds, and the fourth
between 175 and 275 seconds. Radio contact for a specific event occurs randomly between 40 to 80 sec-
onds after the event has occurred. The intensity of events are randomly chosen between 10000 m3/s and
20000 m3/s. The event horizon for each event is 2% of the intensity and the damage radius is 0.1% of the
intensity.
We choose high intensity events to easily illuminate the differences between the topology of our model
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Figure 2.1: Network snapshots at time 0, 200, 400, and 1400 seconds
versus the topology of the Random Walk model. We also choose to include hospitals as stationary objects,
since they will most likely participate in communication with other objects (particularly ambulances and
police). Therefore, there are a total of 104 objects in the system, 4 being immobile from the beginning.
Furthermore, we assumed that radio contact for all events reached ambulance and police regardless of
where they were. All responders are in either CB or cellular radio contact at all times, meaning that the
relevant radius for each event is set large enough to encompass the entire grid.
2.6.2 Snapshot of Topology Change
Figure 2.1 shows a series of four snapshots during one simulation run of our disaster mobility model. The
first box shows the state of the network at the start of the simulation. Object location at this point is
random, except for the 4 hospitals located at each corner of the grid. The second box shows the state of
the network 200 seconds into the simulation. At this time, some events have triggered but radio contact
for many has not occurred. Only objects within the event horizon have reacted at this time. The third
box shows the state of the network 400 seconds into the simulation. By this time, all events have been
triggered and radio-contact has been made. All emergency response objects (police and ambulances) and
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Figure 2.2: Average node density
civilians within the event horizon have reacted to the event. It is now possible to see some of the different
roles active in the system, simply by visually observing their locations. The fourth box shows the state of
the network 1400 seconds into the simulation. By this time, most metrics have come close to convergence
and mobility is noticeable only by ambulances and civilians who have not approached the event horizon.
Civilians who are not curious and have left the event horizon are mobile again.
A clear topological difference between the disaster mobility model and Random Walk is primarily due
to the clustering of objects around the event horizon. This separates the graph into three primary areas:
(1) areas inside event horizons, (2) areas at or near event horizons, (3) areas outside of event horizons.
The first area is very sparse since all civilians able to move leave the scene. Almost all of the concentra-
tion is in the “damage radius”, since emergency response workers immediately move towards that zone.
The only interaction between that zone and the event horizon are the oscillators when they pass through
the event horizon. The second area is very dense since all of the civilians inside the event horizon grav-
itate towards its edge and civilians that happen to stumble into the event horizon stay there. The third
area contains objects who are performing random walks and have not been notified of the event. As the
simulation continuously runs, the third area should slowly lose objects to the second area since they ran-
domly hit the event horizon.
This series of snapshots clearly shows the location of events and the formation of crowds of people
around the event horizon. It also illustrates the behavior of ambulances going to and from events and hos-
pitals. We would expect very similar results in a real disaster scenario, further confirming our implementa-
tion.
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Figure 2.4: Variance of node density
2.6.3 Metric Evaluation
Figures 2.2 through 2.6 clearly show the event-driven response of the metrics around the time of the events.
Between 0 and 100 seconds, the data sets are similar for all metrics, as expected. Between 100 and 355
seconds, during the triggering of events and radio contact time, a clear divergence between the disaster
mobility model and Random Walk model is readily seen as the topology of the event-driven simulation
starts to take form.
Figure 2.2 shows the average node density of the network as time progresses. The average node den-
sity in the disaster mobility model increases in response to events. This is due to the gathering of nodes
around the event horizon, forcing them into a smaller area than before. An interesting observation is that
the size and frequency of the oscillations in average node density become both smaller and less frequent
in the disaster mobility model as time progresses. This is due to the topological convergence of the disas-
ter mobility model that does not occur in Random Walk. The difference in average node density between
the disaster mobility model and Random Walk is important because it gives overall information as to how
many neighbors a node can expect to have at a given time and so provides hints about network connectiv-
ity.
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Figure 2.5: Clustering coefficient
Figure 2.3 shows the maximum node density between the two data sets as time progresses. The max-
imum node density quickly increases in response to the events. There are two highly-clustered areas for
each event in the system, the area inside of the damage radius and the event horizon. The jump in max-
imum node density is due to the quick response by the police to the event, increasing the node density
of nodes at the damage radius. After this, the maximum node density remains relatively constant from
around 500 to 900 seconds, as the maximum density around the event horizon starts to catch up to the
maximum density around the damage radius. At around 900 seconds, the maximum density starts to in-
crease as the maximum density of the event horizon increases. The diminishing of high-frequency oscil-
lations as time progresses is, again, due to the convergence of the disaster mobility model not found in
Random Walk.
Figure 2.4 shows the variance of node density as the simulation progresses in time. The variance of
node density clearly increases as events are triggered. This is because many nodes have either a fairly
small node density (if they are being partitioned or close to being partitioned in the graph), or a high den-
sity (if they are clustered at the event horizon or damage radius). It is interesting to note that the high-
frequency oscillations do not seem to diminish as time progresses. This is likely due to both the Random
Walk civilians and the ambulances oscillating between hospitals and events.
Figure 2.5 shows the clustering coefficient in the network as the simulation progresses in time. The
clustering coefficient of a node i is defined as:
Ci =
2 |{ejk}|
ki(ki − 1)
: vj , vk ∈ Ni, ejk ∈ E,
where Ni are the neighbors of i, E is the set of edges in the graph, and ki is the degree of node i [58] (this
definition assumes an undirected graph). This gives a general indication of how well a node’s neighbors
know each other, which in turn gives insight into how clustered the network is. We define the clustering
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Figure 2.6: Network partitioning
coefficient of a node with degree less than 2 to be 0. The average graph clustering coefficient increases
sharply in response to the events. This is again due to clustering around the event horizon and damage
radius for each event. As before, the diminishing of high-frequency oscillations is apparent.
At any given time, a graph is either partitioned or not. If it is, we say it has a “partition value” of 1.
If not, it has a “partition value” of 0. For each data point, we have averaged the partition value of each
of the 10 simulations. Figure 2.6 shows that the average partition value in the disaster mobility model in-
creases as a result of the events. In fact, due to the high intensity of the events, after around 200 seconds
the network is always partitioned in the disaster mobility model. This is because the nodes at the events
are partitioned from the rest of the network, since the event horizons are generally out of their commu-
nications range. The disaster mobility model consistently has a partition value higher or equal to that of
Random Walk, indicating a more fragile network.
These results show that our mobility model produces a topology much different than that of the pop-
ular Random Walk model. The vast difference between the topologies indicate that it is not sufficient to
use Random Walk as a mobility model for disaster recovery networks.
2.7 Conclusions and Future Directions
This chapter presents a generic event- & role-based mobility paradigm used to characterize movement
patterns of objects in response to environmental events. We specifically concentrate on applying this to
disaster recovery scenarios, where current mobility models fail to realistically represent objects. To accu-
rately characterize the movement of objects in response to one or more disaster events, we have developed
a gravity-based model in which events emit forces that attract or repel objects depending on the object’s
role. Using simplified laws of physics, it is straightforward to calculate the velocity vector of an object,
even in the presence of multiple events.
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Our disaster mobility model has been fully implemented in simulation form and was used to gener-
ate ns2 mobility trace files. The resulting topology of our disaster mobility model had a higher average
node density, maximum node density, variance of node density, and clustering coefficient. This is due to
the grouping of nodes at or near the event horizons and near the damage radius of events. Furthermore,
the partitioned value was consistently higher with our disaster mobility model, indicating the network was
partitioned more often.
Our event- & role-based disaster mobility paradigm realistically captures objects’ responses to disas-
ter events. Furthermore, our simulation results show that the topological characteristics of the network
drastically differ from that of Random Walk. As future work, one could perform studies on actual disas-
ter scenarios to develop a rich set of role-based rules and further refine our low-level gravitational model.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to use our disaster mobility model to understand the effects it has on
routing protocols such as AODV [44] and DSR [28], as well as explore security concerns with a role-based
system. This will most likely lead to the development of new DTN-style disaster routing protocols specifi-
cally tuned for disaster recovery networks.
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Chapter 3
Robust Group Management with
MembersOnly
Effectively utilizing groups in DTNs can both improve the throughput of unicast routing protocols and
open the door for a wide range of group-based paradigms, such as anycast and manycast. Unfortunately,
in DTN environments, there is no centralized entity that can quickly and reliably transmit group member-
ship lists, and hence group information must be disseminated through unreliable and potentially malicious
nodes. In this chapter, we propose a local and robust group information dissemination and consolidation
protocol, called MembersOnly, that both quickly and accurately transmits group membership information
to all nodes in the network, even if multiple malicious nodes attempt to disrupt the process. We show via
analysis and simulations that MembersOnly is able to withstand multiple types of attacks, with only very
limited periods of vulnerability that disappear relatively quickly. This is in contrast to current techniques
that cannot withstand many of these attacks, resulting in quick and thorough corruption of group mem-
bership lists. In addition, we show via simulation that even the most basic routing protocols can gain a
performance advantage when using MembersOnly.
3.1 Group Management in DTNs
Groups are naturally found in many environments. Such grouping is especially common in delay and dis-
ruption tolerant networks, where much of the communication and mobility is based on human interac-
tion [13, 49]. In these environments, the composition of groups may be based on many different abstrac-
tions, including roles (i.e., firefighters or police officers [35]), social networks (i.e., friends communicating
using wireless mobile devices [13]), or geographical closeness (i.e., coworkers who meet every day for meet-
ings). Knowledge of groups can greatly enhance many aspects of communication in DTNs, including uni-
cast [25], anycast and multicast routing, information access control, and privacy. In particular, it has been
shown that contacting a node’s group or affiliation is an effective and efficient first step towards contact-
ing the node itself [25]. However, due to the intermittently connected nature of DTNs, maintaining and
disseminating such group information is challenging, especially in the presence of malicious attackers.
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The enhancement of DTN communication through the use of group information requires that nodes
throughout the network be aware of the membership lists for all groups. While such group membership
management is not difficult in connected environments, heavy partitioning and the lack of readily available
end-to-end paths in DTNs break centralized membership services, just like they break traditional rout-
ing [32, 51, 34]. Instead, group information must be disseminated through the network using DTN-specific
mechanisms that leverage contacts between nodes that meet. Unfortunately, the reliance on contact-based
dissemination and the presence of malicious or faulty nodes may result in inaccurate knowledge of group
membership. While cryptographic techniques (i.e., PKI [33]) could provide proof of group membership,
such techniques are not currently feasible in the intermittently connected environment of DTNs due to the
lack of availability of a trust anchor. The main challenge then lies in ensuring accuracy of disseminated
group membership lists.
Group membership management in DTNs can be broken into four components: group creation, group
information propagation, group information consolidation, and group-assisted routing. During group cre-
ation, members of a group learn about their membership in the group. At this point, nodes outside of the
group are not aware of the group’s membership, or perhaps even of the group itself. Once the group has
been formed, group members propagate the group’s membership list throughout the network. Simultane-
ously, faulty and malicious nodes may be propagating inaccurate membership lists. Non-member nodes
collect and consolidate all group membership lists as they receive them, locally resolving any conflicting
information about a group’s membership list. Finally, the resolved group membership list can be used to
support routing and other services in the DTN. While there exists some work on group creation and group
routing, current approaches ignore propagation and consolidation issues and do not consider the presence
of malicious nodes tampering with group information.
Current approaches to disseminating group membership information in DTNs epidemically [55] prop-
agate the information and, working under the assumption of a completely trustworthy environment, do
not have any mechanism to handle conflicting information [24, 25]. Instead of resolving any conflicting in-
formation, these approaches typically default to selecting the newest information as truth. Unfortunately,
this simplistic approach is inappropriate in many DTN environments, especially in the presence of mali-
cious nodes. Essentially, such approaches form inaccurate group membership information, and so, result
in ineffective routing. We show that these approaches actually break down in the presence of even a small
number of malicious nodes. The main problem with these approaches stems from the lack of quick and
robust propagation and consolidation.
The main contribution of our work comes from the design, analysis and evaluation of MembersOnly,
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our group membership management protocol for DTNs that enables accurate group membership dissem-
ination, even in the presence of multiple malicious nodes, through effective distribution and consolidation
of group membership lists. The main strength of MembersOnly comes from the lack of reliance on any
type of cryptographic techniques, making it an appropriate system for networks where groups are quickly
created and destroyed and where centralized authorities do not exist. Given a set of partially conflict-
ing membership lists, MembersOnly builds off of techniques from data mining to establish a local view
of group membership. Compared to current methods, MembersOnly provides more accurate local views
during convergence and quickly converges to very accurate views. Given that the maintenance of group
membership lists is susceptible to various types of attacks on the consistency of a group’s membership list,
we show both analytically and through simulations that MembersOnly provides accurate results, despite
the presence of moderate levels of malicious nodes. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of accurate group
membership information through the evaluation of a simple group-based routing protocol, showing that
MembersOnly can improve routing performance.
3.2 Four Components to Group-Management
Group-based communication is an important paradigm for DTNs. To understand how to enable and man-
age groups, we break down the problem into four components: group creation, group information propaga-
tion, group information consolidation, and group-assisted routing.
3.2.1 Group Creation
The goal of group creation is to form groups and allow all nodes of the group to know they are a part of
it. Furthermore, group creation also informs group members of other nodes that are part of their group.
In a DTN, groups can be formed based on some common feature of the individual nodes, including geog-
raphy, node roles, and social affiliations. In some cases, groups can be created in advance; in other cases,
they can be rather spontaneous.
The specific algorithms used for group creation depend on the type of group. For example, geographic
groups can be created using centralized algorithms for community detection [40] or distributed versions of
centralized algorithms [25]. In geographic groups, group centrality is important, and approaches such as
weighted network analysis [38] can be implemented in a distributed fashion [25]. On the other hand, some
dynamic groups rely on physical contact and verbal agreement, and so group creation is mostly out-of-
band.
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Although group creation is an interesting problem, we focus primarily on role-based or geographic-
based groups where nodes initially know which groups they are in and group membership does not change.
However, our algorithms do support dynamic groups where members might not initially know all other
members of the group and where group membership changes over time. As a first step towards under-
standing how to support dynamic groups, we evaluate our algorithms during convergence, which gives us
insight into how these algorithms behave in the face of dynamic groups.
3.2.2 Group Information Propagation
Once nodes know which groups they are in and who else is in these groups, they can start to propagate
group membership information throughout the network. Such propagation enables nodes outside of a
group to gather information about the membership list of that group. Propagation is a key component of
group membership management, since the consolidation algorithms discussed next calculate their member-
ship lists based on the information collected during propagation. There are two types of information that
can be transmitted: group names for groups a node is a member of, and entire group membership lists.
Effective propagation faces two challenges: convergence speed and malicious nodes.
The quickest way to propagate group membership information is for all nodes to epidemically dissemi-
nate all group information they are aware of. While optimal in terms of propagation speed, it is extremely
vulnerable to attacks since malicious nodes can spread unrestricted amounts of information about any
group. In doing so, they can convince non-malicious nodes to send false information, even if they are not
part of the group itself, making consolidation too difficult. On the other hand, nodes could be more con-
servative and only disseminate a list of the groups to which they belong [24, 25]. Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches are very slow at propagating information.
To balance speed and security, we propose to limit nodes to only sending information about groups
that they are members of. This limits the spread of false information while keeping propagation speed
fast, providing a good basis for our consolidation protocol to achieve a high level of protection against ma-
licious nodes.
3.2.3 Group Information Consolidation
Since group membership is propagated through the network, nodes collect multiple, potentially conflicting,
pieces of information about each group. The nodes must consolidate this information into a single local
view of each group’s membership list. This local view can then be utilized by the routing protocol for use
with routing decisions. In DTN environments, there is very little applicable work on consolidating conflict-
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ing information. Therefore, we turn to the field of data mining and analysis. The TruthFinder system [61]
solves a similar problem by first obtaining a set of “facts” about “objects” from multiple online servers,
and then attempting to consolidate these potentially conflicting facts to determine the truth about the ob-
ject.
Unfortunately, TruthFinder cannot be easily adapted to fit a DTN environment. It assumes that all
of the servers, or fact providers, are always available and can be readily contacted, and hence gathers all
facts before running the consolidation step; an impossible assumption in DTNs. Even if TruthFinder could
be adapted to work in a disconnected environment, the algorithms in TruthFinder are designed to never
omit any information from the final result, and hence result in a relatively high false positive rate. While
acceptable for TruthFinder’s purposes, a malicious node should not be able to easily append itself to a
membership list.
To support group information consolidation in DTN environments, we present an on-line algorithm
that collects group membership information from each node it meets and consolidates it on-the-fly without
requiring contact with any centralized server. Our algorithm continually refines its decisions as more in-
formation becomes available, quickly converging to very accurate decisions about group membership. The
combination of this algorithm with our membership-based propagation approach enables successful defense
against many types of attacks, even in the presence of a large number of malicious nodes.
3.2.4 Group-Assisted Routing
Accurate group membership information can be used for many services, but the most obvious is group-
assisted routing. For example, BubbleRap [25] utilizes group membership information to improve standard
unicast routing. In essence, BubbleRap attempts to transmit a message to nodes that are part of the mes-
sage destination’s group, assuming that members of the same group have a high probability of contacting
one another. Group information can also be used as a foundation for building anycast routing systems,
where the goal is to reach at least one member of a particular group [20]. In the presences of faults and
malicious users, the accuracy of the group membership information can have a large impact on the perfor-
mance of any routing protocol.
Although we do not focus on routing protocols in this chapter, we evaluate the effect of the accuracy
of group membership information on a simple anycast routing protocol, which can be used as a building
block for more advanced protocols. Essentially, more accurate membership information, even during con-
vergence, significantly improves even a simple anycast routing protocol. As part of our future research, we
are investigating the use of group membership information in unicast, multicast and anycast routing pro-
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tocols, as well as other group-based services.
3.3 MembersOnly
The ability to quickly and accurately distribute group information opens up the door for many group-
based services. In DTN environments, both unreliable links and malicious nodes make this a challenging
problem. In this section, we present MembersOnly, a local and robust group propagation and consolida-
tion protocol that provides accurate views of groups even in the presence of malicious nodes.
3.3.1 Membership Dissemination
Effective propagation of membership information requires quick distribution while using mechanisms that
support high integrity of group membership information. To help achieve this goal, MembersOnly takes a
membership-based approach: nodes propagate group membership lists only for groups of which they are
members. In other words, a set of membership lists, one for each group a node is a member of, is trans-
mitted to every contact that node makes. This approach has two major benefits. First, it provides enough
information for quick propagation, as opposed to transmitting only a list of groups the node is a member
of. Second, it does not transmit everything (namely, information about groups the node is not a part of),
hindering attackers’ abilities to quickly spread false information. In other words, information transmission
is not transitive.
Duplication is expected in DTNs, and hence nodes may receive multiple membership lists from the
same node. Since membership lists are constantly evolving, the newest list should be used. Furthermore,
if a membership list is not replaced with a newer one from the same node for some time, it is possible to
assign a weighting factor to account for aging, which we will consider in future work.
3.3.2 Consolidation of Membership Lists
While MembersOnly enables fast propagation of membership lists, its true power lies in its ability to filter
out malicious information. At any given time, a node has a set of, potentially old, membership lists for
some or all groups in the network. MembersOnly leverages the availability of these multiple lists to build
confidence levels for each potential member of a group, enabling well-informed consolidation that filters
suggestions from malicious nodes. The goal of the consolidation component is to locally create a single
high-confidence membership list for each group in the network. This high-confidence list contains members
that the node believes are really part of the group. There can be at most n · g membership lists stored at a
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node, where n is the number of nodes in the network and g is the number of groups. We note that storage
space for group members should not be a major concern for the vast majority of modern mobile devices,
particular those that are capable of storing videos, music, and pictures.
During consolidation, MembersOnly looks at all recommendations about membership for each poten-
tial member of a group and computes a confidence score about that member. This score is based on pos-
itive evidence extracted from all membership lists that claim that the node is part of the group and neg-
ative evidence extracted from all membership lists that do not have that node listed as part of the group.
To reconcile these differences of opinion, MembersOnly calculates a function of the difference between the
strength of the positive evidence and the strength of the negative evidence. If the result from this function
is greater than a threshold, the node is placed on the high-confidence list for that group. Since malicious
nodes may wrongfully inflate both the positive and the negative evidence, this function must be designed
to filter out malicious evidence.
The MembersOnly consolidation component achieves high-confidence membership lists as follows. Each
node n collects a set of membership lists, L, about a group G. Each entry on a membership list looks
like “node m is a member of group G”. Node n then computes a list, H , that contains, from n’s point of
view, all high confidence members of group G. To determine the confidence of a node m’s membership
in G, MembersOnly creates two subsets of L, Lm (lists containing m) and Lm¯ (lists not containing m).
Xm = |Lm|, the total number of lists m is found on, provides the positive evidence for believing that m
is a member of G and Xm¯ = |Lm¯|, the total number of lists m is not found on, represents the negative
evidence.
Node n can now combine this positive and negative evidence to determine a confidence value about
m’s membership in G. Intuitively, the confidence can be captured by the difference between functions of
the positive and negative evidence. To capture this, we build off of techniques used in data mining [61],
where confidence should start low and quickly rise only after enough supporting evidence is obtained. This
resulting S-shaped curve can be generalized by the popular Sigmoid Function [56] defined as
Y =
1
1 + e−X
.
Applying the Sigmoid function, the strength of the positive and negative evidence for a node m is com-
puted, respectively, as:
1
1 + e−(Xm−α)
and
1
1 + e−(τ ·Xm¯−α)
.
To support flexibility in our model, we have added the parameter α to generalize the standard Sigmoid
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function. Changing α shifts the function along the x-axis, such that Y = 0.5 when X = α. Furthermore,
we add a weighted factor, τ , to the negative evidence. The effect of these parameters on the resulting con-
fidence levels are described in detail shortly.
The total confidence about a node m’s membership in group G can be found by taking the difference
between the positive and negative evidence. Since it is unclear what negative confidence means, we ensure
that the confidence does not fall below 0.
C(m) = max
{
1
1 + e−(Xm−α)
−
1
1 + e−(τ ·Xm¯−α)
, 0
}
C(m) gives an indication of how confident node n should be in node m’s membership. After node n com-
putes this value for all possible members of a group, it selects the high-confident nodes to be part of the
consolidated list H :
H = {m|C(m) ≥ γ},
where γ is a system defined parameter that determines an accuracy threshold for the system. Essentially,
if the difference between the strength of the positive evidence and the strength of the negative evidence
is greater than the threshold γ, the membership in question is accepted. This process is repeated for all
groups the node is aware of, and results in a consolidated list H for each group. The final set of H values
can then be passed to the routing protocol.
Note that the parameter τ ∈ [0, 1] is used as a weighting factor for negative evidence, and the larger
it is, the less negative evidence is needed to doubt an entry. In Section 3.4, we show how τ should be set
to counter various attacks. Another important parameter is α. The smaller α is, the faster the propaga-
tion speed is when there are no attackers in the network, because a smaller amount of positive evidence is
needed to reach γ. However, as α gets smaller, it has a negative impact on the appropriate setting of τ ,
which is detrimental to the system in regards to attacks. The discussion of these parameters is continued
in Section 3.4.
3.4 Model Analysis with Attackers
The primary goal of MembersOnly is to provide quick and accurate group information to all nodes in
the network, even in the presence of multiple malicious nodes. In this section, we present two high level
classes of attacks and show, via mathematical analysis, how MembersOnly can be configured to defend
against them.
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3.4.1 Potential Attacks
We now briefly describe two generic attacks, an addition attack and a deletion attack, that give good in-
sight into how attackers can affect and exploit different systems. We assume malicious nodes have similar
abilities to normal nodes, in that they can send and receive any information they want during a contact.
The goal of the addition attack is to convince as many nodes as possible that the attacking node is
part of some or all groups in the network. Therefore, attackers must convince normal nodes that they are
valid entries on the local membership lists for those groups. If successful, attackers will be members of
many groups and will be considered good intermediate nodes for routing to those groups. This positions
the attackers to launch powerful black hole attacks, or other more sophisticated attacks. To demonstrate
the effect of this attack, in Section 3.5, we instantiate a version of the addition attack where each attacker
appends itself to all membership lists, and transmits this new information during contacts.
The goal of the deletion attack is to convince as many nodes as possible that valid members of a group
are in fact not members. Attackers must therefore provide enough negative evidence about a node to cast
doubt about it’s membership in a group. Deleting members from membership lists can severely hinder
routing performance. Essentially, a denial-of-service attack is launched, since nodes hold data until they
meet a member of a particular group. To demonstrate the effect of this attack, in Section 3.5, we instan-
tiate a “worst-case” version of the deletion attack where attackers simply broadcast membership lists con-
taining only themselves for all groups they are currently aware of. This essentially attempts to delete all
true nodes from the group.
3.4.2 Model Analysis with Attackers
Given that malicious nodes have the ability to perform both addition and deletion attacks, we now per-
form an analysis of our model to determine how best to defend against these attacks. Recall that if
1
1 + e−(Xm−α)
−
1
1 + e−(τ ·Xm¯−α)
≥ γ,
then node n is confident to add m to the high confidence list H for group G. Also recall that if malicious
nodes perform a deletion attack, their goal is to inflate the negative evidence against m enough to drop
the confidence value below γ. Hence, to protect against this attack, τ , the negative evidence weighting fac-
tor, should be decreased. This gives less weight to the false negative evidence the attackers are providing.
In contrast, if malicious nodes perform an addition attack, their goal is to inflate the positive evidence for
their own false information, to bring the confidence value above γ. To protect against this, τ should be
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increased, so true group members can provide the necessary negative evidence against the false positive
evidence.
If a system only wishes to defend against deletion attacks, τ should be 0. Similarly, if a system only
wishes to defend against addition attacks, τ should be 1. However, it is possible to set τ to defend against
both addition and deletion attacks simultaneously by keeping it within a valid range. Larger ranges of τ
are best, since this gives more flexibility in the actual choice for τ for a given system. To find the outer
limits of this range, we analyze the steady state case, when every node has met every other node, to en-
sure that both types of attacks are, in the long run, completely defeated. We assume, for simplicity, that
attackers cannot convince actual group members of changes in their own groups. While in practice this
may not be true, particularly if nodes can join and leave groups without informing all group members of
the action, it provides a good approximation.
In the MembersOnly group information propagation component, the only way a node can obtain infor-
mation about a group is to meet a member of that group (or, at least a node that claims to be a member
of that group). Given M , the total number of true members of a particular group, and A, the total num-
ber of attackers in the network attacking that group, the total amount of possible evidence for or against
a node’s membership is M +A.
For a deletion attack in the long run, nodes outside of the group obtain A recommendations against
and M recommendations for the node in question. To protect against this attack, the confidence value
computed by the non-member node should be greater than γ. In other words,
1
1 + e−(M−α)
−
1
1 + e−(τ ·A−α)
≥ γ.
Solving for τ , we find that to protect against the deletion attack,
τ ≤
1
A
·
[
α− ln
(
−(γ + eα−M + γ · eα−M )
γ + γ · eα−M − 1
)]
.
Now consider attackers launching an addition attack against a particular group, where the goal is to
get non-members to believe that the malicious nodes are actually part of the group. In the long run, the
nodes outside of the group will have A recommendations for the entries and M recommendations against
them. This is analogous to the previous inequality, and hence to protect against the addition attack,
τ ≥
1
M
·
[
α− ln
(
−(γ + eα−A + γ · eα−A)
γ + γ · eα−A − 1
)]
.
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It is immediately clear that if the number of attackers is greater than the number of nodes in the group,
MembersOnly cannot defend against both types of attacks simultaneously. In this case, the user would
have to choose which attack they were most concerned about, and adjust τ accordingly.
To clarify, consider the following example, which we also use for our evaluations. Assume a group of
size of M = 45 and γ = 0.75.
Figure 3.1: Valid ranges for τ
When choosing τ , it is important to choose a value that is within the valid range for the maximum ex-
pected number of malicious nodes in the network, to ensure that the system is within the valid τ range
at all times. Figure 3.1 shows the valid ranges of τ as the number of attackers varies from 10 to 45. This
figure shows that MembersOnly is able to defend against both addition and deletion attacks at the same
time, as long as the number of attackers is less than the group size of the group in question. However, as
the number of malicious nodes increases, the valid range of τ shrinks. It is also interesting to note that as
α decreases, the ranges become smaller, which is undesirable. However, as α decreases, the propagation
speed increases, which is desirable. We recommend setting α to be around the square root of the group
size, since this allows for both quick propagation speeds and large ranges of τ . This model currently re-
quires a weak estimate of the group size as well as an upper bound on the number of attackers in the net-
work. While obtaining weak estimates like this is often not too difficult in practice, we are currently look-
ing at ways to alleviate this requirement.
3.5 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is two-fold. First, we evaluate the propagation speed and attack resistance of
MembersOnly in comparison to existing approaches and show that MembersOnly enables fast propagation
and is extremely resistant to attacks, even in the presence of multiple malicious nodes. Second, we evalu-
ate the effect of the parameters τ and α on the behavior of MembersOnly.
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3.5.1 Evaluation Setup
For comparison, we use two propagation approaches: CopyMyGroups, where nodes transmit a list of ev-
ery group they are members of to every contact they meet, and CopyEverything, where nodes transmit
all group membership information they know to every contact they meet. For both of these protocols, the
consolidation component is to simply take the newest version of any membership information as truth.
While groups remain static throughout these simulations, we specifically evaluate the convergence time,
giving insight into how dynamic groups would perform.
Average group completion percentage captures the speed and pervasiveness of group membership list
propagation by tracking the completion percentage of a group over all nodes and all groups. Note that all
nodes have access to an oracle with all correct group membership lists strictly for the purpose of metric
computation. This metric will increase as soon as any node becomes aware of any subset of members for
any group. The higher the metric’s value is, the faster the system is at propagating group information.
Both the normal propagation speed and the deletion attack effectiveness are measured using this metric.
It is appropriate for the deletion attack, since the goal of the attackers is to delete as many members from
every local membership list as possible, hindering propagation.
For the addition attack, the average percentage of corrupt groups captures how corrupt local member-
ship lists are. A conservative approach is taken to say that a node’s view of a group membership list is
corrupt if that node (falsely) believes at least one attacker is actually a member of the group. It is the at-
tackers’ goal to corrupt as many groups as possible, driving the metric up. Hence, the lower the metric’s
value is, the better the system is at protecting against the addition attack.
All metrics are evaluated over time. Each of the evaluated systems eventually converges to either 0 or
1 for all metrics, and therefore it is most interesting to see how the curves progress over time, and how
they look relative to one another. The exact time values are not as important as the characteristics of the
curves, since these values change with properties of the network such as movement speed, transmission
range, number of nodes, etc. Essentially, even though attackers may lose out in the end, there can be peri-
ods of vulnerability where attackers can make gains.
All simulations use the ONE [29] simulator and the random waypoint model, with nodes moving be-
tween 3 and 7 meters per second. There are a total of 250 nodes divided into 5 non-overlapping groups of
either 50 nodes (if there are no attackers), 47 nodes (if there are 15 attackers), or 45 nodes (if there are 25
attackers). The transmission range of each node is 250m and the world size is 3.5 km x 3.5 km. All data
points are the average of 10 runs with 95% confidence intervals. There are data points every 50 simulation
seconds; however, many markers have been omitted for clarity. For all simulations, γ = 0.75.
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Figure 3.2: Group Completion
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Figure 3.3: (a) Addition Attack, (b) Deletion Attack
3.5.2 Comparative Evaluation
To understand the impact of the propagation algorithm, MembersOnly is compared to both CopyMy-
Groups and CopyEverything by looking at membership list propagation speed as well as the effective-
ness of the addition and deletion attacks. The number of malicious nodes, if any, in the simulations are
denoted by parentheses next to the system name. The two numbers next to MembersOnly represent the
parameters α and τ . As previously described, α = 7 for these simulations, which constrains the choice of τ
from around 0.13 to around 0.24, which handles up to 25 attackers. Therefore, we chose τ = 0.2.
Propagation algorithms aim to spread membership lists throughout the network. As expected, Copy-
Everything shows the optimal speed since it epidemically disseminates all information (see Figure 3.2).
Virtually all nodes are correctly aware of all membership lists in around 250 seconds. In contrast, Copy-
MyGroups, is relatively slow since it only transmits a list of groups a node is a part of during each con-
tact, not a membership list of those groups. Therefore, to reach 100%, every node would have to come in
contact with every other node. By the end of the simulation, at 5,000 seconds, this approach reaches only
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around 85% completion. MembersOnly, which transmits group membership lists for all groups a node is
a part of, starts off slightly slower than the other systems since, for security reasons, it waits for sufficient
evidence before accepting information. However, after a sufficient amount of evidence is collected, nodes
propagate the information very quickly.
Once attackers are introduced into the system, it is interesting to consider the average percentage of
corrupt groups. For the addition attack (see Figure 3.3(a)), the higher the percentage, the more penetra-
tion the attackers gain, and hence the less resistant the system is to the attack. CopyEverything is slightly
worse than CopyMyGroups. However, both are terrible at resisting the addition attack since the attack
nodes persistently claim to be part of every group they know of. When a node meets enough attack nodes,
it is convinced that at least some of the attack nodes are part of the group. This node then propagates
that false information, convincing other nodes to do the same. This degenerating process is quite fast for
both systems. In contrast, MembersOnly is more careful and considers the absence of information (i.e.,
a membership list without an attacker on it) as evidence against that information. Hence, the attackers
can gain a temporary advantage with some nodes. However, in the long run, the attackers will not be able
to overcome the honest nodes. The period of time where the metric is non-zero is a vulnerability period
where some nodes wrongfully believe attackers are part of a group. As expected, the duration and promi-
nence of this period increases as the number of attack nodes increases. However, even with 25 attackers,
MembersOnly keeps the vulnerability period limited, and eventually the percentage goes to zero.
Finally, in the deletion attack, the attackers try to disrupt the propagation of group membership lists.
With CopyEverything, membership lists quickly propagate and some gains are made (see Figure 3.3(b)).
However, attackers continuously promoting membership lists with only themselves eventually cause a larger
and larger number of nodes to believe that the membership list is actually blank. This results in the per-
centage going to zero, indicating the attack was successful. Interestingly, in CopyMyGroups the attack
is not only unsuccessful, but useless since CopyMyGroups is immune from this attack because only a list
of groups is propagated, never a membership list of those groups. Hence, there is no way for an attack
node to convince another node of any membership list, let alone a blank one. The result of the attack on
MembersOnly is simply a shift in time of the curve. The attackers are able to convince nodes to delay ac-
cepting membership lists as true for some time. However, eventually nodes running MembersOnly receive
enough evidence from honest nodes to override the evidence given by attack nodes. Therefore, attackers
simply delay the inevitable.
In summary, although CopyEverything is extremely fast, it is also extremely susceptible to both ad-
dition and deletion attacks. While CopyMyGroups is immune from deletion attacks, it is very susceptible
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Figure 3.5: (a) Addition Attack, (b) Deletion Attack
to addition attacks and also too slow for practical use. In comparison, MembersOnly is both resistant to
addition and deletion attacks, and can propagate group membership at a quick speed.
3.5.3 Parameter Evaluation
The parameters of MembersOnly determine both the propagation speed and resiliency to attack. Par-
ticularly, there is an interesting interplay between α and τ , which was explored in the analysis from Sec-
tion 3.4. Recall, that as α decreases, the propagation speed should increase, since nodes can more quickly
reach the threshold γ. However, as the analysis shows, this also decreases the valid range of τ . If τ is too
low, addition attacks will succeed, and if τ is too high, deletion attacks will succeed.
When there are no attackers in the network, smaller values of α result in faster group information
propagation due to the a smaller amount of positive evidence required to reach γ (see Figure 3.4). With
addition attacks, MembersOnly successfully defends against the attack for all values of α (see Figure 3.5(a)),
because τ = 0.2, which is always greater than the minimum τ value, according to the model. Recall that
lower values of α actually drop the range numerically, while shrinking it, and hence, lower values of α for
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the same τ result in better protection against an addition attack. However, in the event of a deletion at-
tack, the value of τ is greater than the maximum τ value for α = 3 and α = 5, according to the analysis.
Essentially, MembersOnly cannot defend against the deletion attack for these two values of α, while it can
for α = 7 (see Figure 3.5(b)).
3.6 Group-based Routing
Obtaining quick and accurate group information about a network opens the door for a wider range and
greater efficiency of routing protocols. One immediate result is the ability to efficiently perform anycast
routing, which attempts to deliver a message to at least one member of a particular group [20]. Anycast
routing is useful as a stand-alone routing technique for many scenarios. For instance, in emergency re-
sponse networks, it may be more beneficial for an injured person to contact any emergency responder
rather than a particular one. It is also useful as a means to improve unicast routing by first anycasting
a message to a member of the destination’s group, and then unicasting it from there.
To understand the impact of the accuracy of group membership on routing protocols, we evaluate a
basic single-copy anycast routing protocol that utilizes group information to make routing decisions. We
show that routing protocol performance is very dependent on the underlying group membership manage-
ment. MembersOnly can improve routing performance by close to 8% under certain attack scenarios, in
relation to current popular systems. For simplicity, a single-copy protocol was implemented, where replicas
of messages are not created [53], and hence resource management is less important. This basic protocol
acts as a building block for more advanced anycast routing techniques [36].
3.6.1 Anycast Routing and Attacks
One prominent building block for routing in DTNs is direct delivery, where a node simply holds a mes-
sage until it comes in contact with the destination of that message. This building block allows for a store-
and-carry approach to DTN routing and can even act as a very basic stand alone protocol. Similarly, a
popular building block for anycast routing is to perform direct delivery to destination groups instead of
destination nodes. This very simple protocol stores and carries all messages that are destined for a group
rather than a node, until it meets a target group member. Since the message was successfully delivered (at
least in the eyes of the deliverer) to the group, delivery is consider successful.
This group-based anycast routing protocol is reliant on the underlying group system for quick and ac-
curate group information and so it is interesting to see how malicious nodes spreading bad group infor-
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Figure 3.6: Routing Performance
mation affect the performance of the protocol. The malicious nodes attempt to perform multiple black
hole attacks, where the goal of each is an aggressive addition attack to get on as many membership lists
as possible. By getting on multiple membership lists, attackers can intercept and drop messages destined
for those groups.
3.6.2 Performance Comparisons
The goal of this evaluation is to see how different group membership management approaches affect the
performance of anycast routing under attack scenarios. We implemented the basic anycast routing pro-
tocol described above in the ONE simulator. For group membership management, we evaluate the per-
formance of the anycast routing protocol using each of the following approaches: MembersOnly, CopyEv-
erything, and CopyMyGroups. Additionally, we implemented an oracle module to provide a baseline that
gives the routing protocol perfect group information at all times.
All simulations were done using the same parameters as before, except with a total of 150 nodes and
groups of size 50 − A/3, where A is the number of attackers. Messages are sourced from random non-
malicious nodes and are destined for a particular group, ensuring that the group is different from the group
of the message source. Every node sources a single message at a random time during every 200 second in-
terval. Each message is 50kB in size, and buffers are large enough to hold all messages. Message delivery
ratio, the metric used, is the total number of messages successfully delivered over the total number of mes-
sages sourced in the network. Every data point is the average of 10 runs.
By utilizing MembersOnly, the group-based anycast routing protocol achieves an approximately 8%
improvement over current group approaches during some attack scenarios (see Figure 3.6). Furthermore,
since the vulnerability window is relatively small during a low to moderate attack level, malicious nodes
had trouble getting on more than a few local membership lists. Hence, MembersOnly performs close to
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optimal much longer than other protocols in this environment. Conversely, in both CopyEverything and
CopyMyGroups, many membership lists are quickly compromised and hence routing performance is signifi-
cantly hurt.
3.7 Conclusions and Future Directions
We have presented MembersOnly, a local and robust group propagation and consolidation protocol that
both quickly and accurately distributes group membership lists, even in the presence of multiple malicious
nodes. We have shown via analysis and simulation that MembersOnly can withstand multiple types of
attacks while still delivering membership lists quickly. Finally, we have shown that even the most basic
group-based routing protocol can gain a performance advantage when using MembersOnly over existing
protocols.
There are many interesting avenues for future work. First, one could investigate automated group cre-
ation. By analyzing trends in mobility and communication patterns, many types of groups, including so-
cial and geographic, can be automatically detected. Second, to improve the attack resistance of Member-
sOnly even further, one could utilize past information to help detect and limit malicious behavior in a net-
work.
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Chapter 4
EBR: Efficient Unicast Routing in
DTNs
One of the primary hindrances to wide-spread DTN use is the lack of an efficient unicast protocol. Cur-
rent work in DTN routing protocols leverage epidemic-style algorithms that trade off injecting many copies
of messages into the network for increased probability of message delivery. However, such techniques can
cause a large amount of contention in the network, increase overall delays, and drain each mobile node’s
limited battery supply. In this chapter, we present a new DTN routing algorithm, called Encounter-Based
Routing (EBR), which maximizes delivery ratios while minimizing overhead and delay. Furthermore, we
present a means of securing EBR against black hole denial-of-service attacks. EBR achieves up to a 40%
improvement in message delivery over the current state-of-the-art, as well as achieving up to a 145% in-
crease in goodput. Also, we further show how EBR outperforms other protocols by introduce three new
composite metrics that better characterize DTN routing performance.
4.1 Unicast Motivation and Challenges
Delay and disruption tolerant networks transport application data by creating a “store and forward” net-
work where no infrastructure exists. Although end-to-end connectivity may not be available between two
nodes, DTN routing protocols instead take advantage of temporal paths created in the network as nodes
encounter their neighbors and exchange messages they have been asked to forward. Since there are no
guarantees that a route will ever be available, many current DTN routing protocols apply epidemic-style
techniques [55], leveraging the fact that an increased number of copies of a particular message in the net-
work should improve the probability that the message will reach its intended destination. However, such
techniques come at a high price in terms of network resources, resulting in the rapid depletion of buffer
space and energy on resource-limited devices, the rapid depletion of available bandwidth, and the poten-
tial to greatly increase end-to-end delay.
A number of routing protocols have been proposed to enable data delivery in such challenging envi-
ronments [4, 10, 17, 18, 19, 32, 45, 51, 52, 57, 63]. However, many of these protocols trade overhead and
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computational complexity for increased successful delivery. This overhead expresses itself as more traffic
in the network creating more contention in clusters of high connectivity and increased energy consumption
for nodes exchanging messages. Furthermore, many DTN protocols make routing and forwarding decisions
based on advertised contact information, allowing for denial-of-service attacks over the already intermit-
tently connected network. All of these effects can decrease overall network performance.
One method to mitigate this overhead is to identify key properties in the network that allow for more
intelligent forwarding and message replication decisions. For example, in many human-centric environ-
ments targeted by DTNs, such as disaster scenarios and certain vehicular networks, different classes of
nodes naturally tend to have more node encounters than others. The main contribution of our research in
this chapter capitalizes on this network property to design a DTN routing protocol that uses local obser-
vations about a node’s environment. Our protocol, Encounter-Based Routing (EBR), uses an encounter-
based metric for optimization of message passing that maximizes message delivery ratio while minimizing
overhead both in terms of extra traffic injected into the network and control overhead, as well as minimiz-
ing latency as a second order metric. Furthermore, we present a security component to our protocol that
protects against denial-of-service attacks aimed at eliminating copies of messages in the system. To fully
evaluate EBR, we propose the use of three composite metrics, which clearly illustrate the interplay be-
tween fundamental metrics like message delivery ratio, goodput, and end-to-end delay. We then use these
metrics to evaluate EBR and compare it to the major protocols developed for DTNs, showing improved
performance and overhead. EBR achieves up to a 40% improvement in message delivery over the current
state-of-the-art, as well as achieving up to a 145% increase in goodput.
4.2 DTN Routing Protocol Taxonomy
DTN routing protocols can be classified as either forwarding-based or replication-based. Forwarding-based
protocols keep one copy of a message in the network and attempt to forward that copy toward the des-
tination at each encounter. In contrast, replication-based protocols insert multiple copies, or replicas, of
a message into the network to increase the probability of message delivery. Essentially, replication-based
protocols leverage a trade-off between resource usage (e.g., node memory and bandwidth) and probability
of message delivery. Although all replication-based protocols take advantage of this trade-off, these pro-
tocols can be further separated into two classes based on the number of replicas created: quota-based and
flooding-based.
Flooding-based protocols send a replica of each message to as many nodes as possible, whereas quota-
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Classification Previous Work
Forwarding Jain et al. [26], DSR [28],
AODV [44]
Flooding-based Replication Epidemic, Prophet [32],
MaxProp [10], RAPID [4]
Quota-based Replication Spray and Wait [51],
Spray and Focus [52]
Table 4.1: Taxonomy of DTN routing protocols
based protocols intentionally limit the number of replicas. Assume that mt indicates the maximum num-
ber of unique messages (excluding replicas) that have been created prior to some time t. Then an upper
bound on the total number of messages (including replicas) in the network at time t is mt · L, where L
is the maximum number of replicas for any given message. L can be a probabilistic or discrete variable.
Given these definitions, a quota-based routing protocol can be defined as follows:
A replication-based routing protocol is quota-based if and only if L is independent of the number
of nodes in the network (assuming the characteristics of the network, such as storage, bandwidth,
and mobility, allow for every node to have a replica of every message).
Conversely, any replication-based protocol where L is dependent on the number of nodes in the net-
work is defined to be flooding-based.
These definitions allow us to classify routing protocols into three groups (see Table 4.1). Traditional
Internet routing protocols (e.g., IP [50]) and ad-hoc routing protocols (e.g., AODV [44], DSR [28]) are
forwarding-based, since nodes along a route forward messages toward the destination without storing or
creating extra replicas of the messages. Forwarding-based approaches for DTNs have been proposed [22,
53], but are limited in their effectiveness due the instability or even non-existence of routes from any par-
ticular node to the destination. One forwarding-based approach, proposed by Jain et al. [26], utilizes fu-
ture knowledge about node mobility and specific node encounters to improve the protocol (e.g., knowledge
that a node will encounter a bus at noon that will have access to the Internet). However, the availability
of such future knowledge constitutes a special class of DTN networks and such approaches will not work
in general.
Epidemic routing is an obvious example of a flooding-based protocol, since the number of replicas in
the system is directly dependent on the number of nodes in the system. One of the major flooding-based
protocols for DTNs is MaxProp [10]. MaxProp is flooding-based, since, if resources and mobility allow, it
is possible for every node in the network to have a replica of the same message. Other examples of flooding-
based DTN protocols include Prophet [32], RAPID [4] and PREP [45]. Prophet attempts to use informa-
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tion about the likelihood of nodes encountering particular destinations to optimize the exchange of mes-
sages. RAPID orders messages through the use of utility functions, with the goal of intentionally maxi-
mizing specific metrics (e.g., delay). PREP, a variant of Epidemic Routing, assigns priority to messages
based on costs to destination as well as expiration time, and uses this priority to determine which mes-
sages should be deleted or transmitted when buffer or bandwidth is constrained respectively. In an at-
tempt to mitigate the inherent resource burden from flooding-based protocols, many of these protocols
specify complex optimizations, making implementation harder and error-prone. These optimizations are
tuned and tweaked for performance in different environments.
Recent work by Erramilli et. al recognizes similar problems with current DTN routing protocols and
proposes techniques to utilize properties of nodes, such as contact rate, when making forwarding deci-
sions [18, 17]. They are concerned with choosing the best node(s) to forward messages to based on utility
values. This technique, however, can result in flooding-like behavior if many encountered nodes have high
utility values. On the other hand, if many encountered nodes have low utility value, messages may never
leave the source nodes.
The main problem with flooding-based protocols is their high demand on network resources, such as
storage and bandwidth. This led to work in developing quota-based protocols. Spray and Wait [51] is a
quota-based protocol where an upper bound on the number of replicas allowed in the network is fixed
during message creation. Spray and Wait breaks routing into two phases: a spray phase, where message
replicas are disseminated, and a wait phase, where nodes with single-copy messages wait until a direct en-
counter with the respective destinations. A follow-up protocol called Spray and Focus [52] uses a similar
spray phase, followed by a focus phase, where single copies can be forwarded to help maximize a utility
function. While both Spray and Wait and Spray and Focus succeed in limiting some of the overhead of
flooding-based protocols, their delivery ratios suffer.
While quota-based protocols are much better stewards of network resources than their flooding-based
counterparts, one possible criticism is their inability to successfully deliver a comparable amount of mes-
sages. We show this to be false by developing a quota-based protocol using an encounter-based routing
metric that has extremely low routing overhead, while maintaining delivery ratios better than or compara-
ble to current flooding-based protocols.
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4.3 Encounter-based Routing (EBR)
The primary goal of a DTN routing protocol is to obtain high message delivery ratios and good latency
performance, while maintaining low overhead. However, current flooding-based protocols (e.g., MaxProp [10],
RAPID [4]) achieve high delivery ratios at the expense of excessive network resource usage, and current
quota-based protocols (e.g., Spray And Wait [51], Spray and Focus [52]) that reduce this overhead are not
able to achieve comparable delivery rates.
In response, we present Encounter-based Routing (EBR), a quota-based DTN routing protocol that
achieves high delivery ratios comparable to flooding-based protocols, while maintaining low network over-
head. This improvement in delivery ratio is accomplished by taking advantage of the following observed
mobility property of certain networks: the future rate of node encounters can be roughly predicted by past
data. This property is useful because nodes that experience a large number of encounters are more likely
to successfully pass the message along to the final destination than those nodes who only infrequently en-
counter others. Many networks experience this phenomenon; examples include disaster recovery networks,
where ambulances and police tend to be more mobile and bridge more cluster gaps than civilians, and
vehicular-based networks, where certain vehicles take popular routes.
Since EBR is a quota-based routing protocol, it limits the number of replicas of any message in the
system, minimizing network resource usage. Additionally, EBR bases routing decisions on nodes’ rates of
encounters, showing preference to message exchanges with nodes that have high encounter rates. These
routing decisions result in higher probability of message delivery, avoiding routes that may never result in
delivery and so reducing the total number of message exchanges.
In EBR, information about a node’s rate of encounter is a purely local metric and can be tracked using
a small number of variables. Therefore, EBR is able to maintain very low state overhead, as compared to
other protocols that can require up to O(n) routing messages exchanged during every contact connection,
and O(n2) routing state locally stored (e.g., MaxProp [10], Prophet [32]). A further strength of EBR is
that its message replication rules are simple to understand and implement, as opposed to complex rules
found in many protocols, minimizing the chance of bugs and reducing computational complexity (e.g., the
resources in terms of CPU cycles required to operate the protocol).
4.3.1 Algorithm
Every node running EBR is responsible for maintaining their past rate of encounter average, which is used
to predict future encounter rates. When two nodes meet, the relative ratio of their respective rates of en-
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counter determines the appropriate fraction of message replicas the nodes should exchange. The primary
purpose of tracking the rate of encounter is to intelligently decide how many replicas of a message a node
should transfer during a contact opportunity.
To track a node’s rate of encounter, every node maintains two pieces of local information: an encounter
value (EV), and a current window counter (CWC). EV represents the node’s past rate of encounters as
an exponentially weighted moving average, while CWC is used to obtain information about the number of
encounters in the current time interval. EV is periodically updated to account for the most recent CWC
in which rate of encounter information was obtained. Updates to EV are computed as follows:
EV ← α · CWC + (1− α) · EV.
This exponentially weighted moving average places an emphasis proportional to α on the most recent
complete CWC. Updating CWC is straightforward: for every encounter, the CWC is incremented. When
the current window update interval has expired, the encounter value is updated and the CWC is reset
to zero. In our experiments, we found an α of 0.85 and update interval of around 30 seconds allow for
reasonable results in a variety of networks. These parameter choices are further elaborated upon in Sec-
tion 4.5.
Since EV represents a prediction of the future rate of encounters for each node per time interval, the
node with the highest EV represents a higher probability of successful message delivery. Therefore, when
two nodes meet, they compare their EVs. The number of replicas of a message transferred during a con-
tact opportunity is proportional to the ratio of the EVs of the nodes. For two nodes A and B, for every
message Mi, node A sends
mi ·
EVB
EVA + EVB
replicas of Mi, where mi is the total number of Mi replicas stored at node A. For example, assume node
A has 4 replicas of a message M1 and 8 replicas of a message M2. Furthermore, assume node A, with
EVA = 5, comes in contact with node B, with EVB = 15. Node A sends
15
5+15 =
3
4 of the replicas of
each message. Therefore, node A transmits 3 replicas of message M1 and 6 replicas of message M2.
Algorithm 1 presents the basic form of EBR, where Wi represents the current window update interval
parameter.
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Algorithm 1 EBRRouting
if time ≥ nextUpdate then
EV ← α · CWC + (1− α) · EV
CWC ← 0
nextUpdate← time+Wi
end if
if Contact C available then
for All messages Mi in local buffer do
mi ←Mi.numOfReplicas
msend ← ⌊mi ·
EVc
EVc+EV
⌋
Send msend replicas of Mi to node C
end for
end if
4.3.2 Generalizing EBR
In this section, we prove that EBR adheres to the definition of a quota-based protocol (as described in
Section 4.2) and show the relevant bounds, both for the simple version, where L, the maximum number of
replicas of a message, is discrete, and for a more general version, allowing the use of probabilistic L values.
For discrete L values, it is easy to show that EBR is quota-based. Along with its data, every message
contains a value indicating the maximum number of replicas into which this current message is allowed to
be split. As an example, assume an application at node A creates a message with the maximum allowable
replicas set to 10. Assume node A encounters node B and, based on the EBR protocol described in Sec-
tion 4.3.1, wishes to transmit 8 replicas. Then, A creates a copy of the message for node B and assigns
B’s maximum allowable replicas to 8. Furthermore, A resets its maximum allowable replicas to 2. Contin-
uing this procedure in a recursive fashion maintains the bound set by the initial message.
However, L values are not limited to a discrete maximum number of replicas. The discrete structure
can easily be relaxed into a probabilistic structure, while maintaining meaningful (yet probabilistic) bounds.
Probabilistic L values can allow for less sensitivity to exact network conditions. When using discrete L
values, changes to the initial number of message replicas allows for a fundamental tradeoff between mes-
sage delivery ratio, goodput, and average latency (see Section 4.5). Using probabilistic L values and chang-
ing the variance and mean can allow applications to compromise and not require exact decisions about the
number of allowable replicas.
While any distribution may be used in this probabilistic model, the Gaussian distribution allows for
immediate, eloquent properties that help establish the bound on the number of messages in the network.
In this case, the application specifies the mean and variance of the distribution, instead of a discrete num-
ber. Assume a node A wishes to split the message M into two replicas, MA and MB. Node A must follow
the following EBR message splitting rule:
50
If M ∼ N(µ, σ2), then it can only be split into MA ∼ N(µA, σ
2
A) and MB ∼ N(µB, σ
2
B) such that
µ = µA + µB and σ
2 = σ2A + σ
2
B .
For example, a message with mean 10 and variance 5 may be split into two messages, one with mean
8 and variance 4, and one with mean 2 and variance 1. It may not, however, be split into a message of
mean 8 and variance 4, and one with mean 7 and variance 1. As a further note, EBR maintains the ratio
of mean to variance for all message splits.
This message splitting rule preserves the Gaussian distribution for the two newly created replicas. This
is due to a result from statistics known as Cramer’s Theorem:
• If X + Y ∼ N(µx + µy, σ
2
x + σ
2
y),
then X ∼ N(µx, σ
2
x) and Y ∼ N(µy, σ
2
y).
We now demonstrate that this general version of EBR is a quota-based replication protocol, and estab-
lish an upper bound, by proving the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3.1 Let S be a schedule of future message creations. Let t be an arbitrary future time. As-
sume
M1,M2, ...,Mi ∈ S are all the messages created before time t. Assume each message Mi has a Gaus-
sian random variable (for notational ease, we refer to this directly as the message Mi), with mean µi and
variance σ2i , that represents the maximum number of replicas the current message is allowed to be split
into.
The upper bound on the maximum number of message replicas in the system is:
U ∼ N

 i∑
j=1
µj ,
i∑
j=1
σ2j

 .
Proof : Let U be the sum of all message replicas in the system. Assuming messages never split, there
will be i messages in the system, each with mean µi and variance σ
2
i . We utilize the following rule of lin-
earity for Gaussian distributions (the converse of Cramer’s Theorem):
• If X ∼ N(µx, σ
2
x) and Y ∼ N(µy, σ
2
y), then X + Y ∼ N(µx + µy, σ
2
x + σ
2
y).
Therefore,
U =
i∑
j=1
Mj ∼ N

 i∑
j=1
µj ,
i∑
j=1
σ2j

 .
Now assume a message, Mj ∼ N(µj , σ
2
j ) is split into Mj1 ∼ N(µj1, σ
2
j1) and Mj2 ∼ N(µj2, σ
2
j2) such
that µj = µj1 + µj2 and σ
2
j = σ
2
j1 + σ
2
j2 (the message splitting rule of EBR). Then by the same linearity
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rules, Mj =Mj1 +Mj2, leaving U unchanged. QED
One minor issue to address is that the statistical rules and theorems each assume true Gaussian dis-
tributions. However, it does not make sense in our system for a message M to hold a negative value. The
probability of this occurring can be made sufficiently small by forcing the application to choose sufficiently
low variances for corresponding means (which can never be below zero).
4.4 Securing EBR
The decision regarding how many replicas of a message a node should transmit to a contact depends com-
pletely upon the ratio of both parties’ encounter values. Therefore, a malicious node can convince a node
following protocol to transmit virtually any percentage of replicas to it. One of the most worrisome re-
sults is the possibility of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack where malicious nodes act as “black holes”. Ma-
licious nodes performing this attack advertise an ultra-high encounter value, causing all contacts to send
almost all replicas to them. The malicious nodes then simply delete these messages, attempting to stop, or
at least slow, message delivery.
Work by Burgess et. al shows that two popular types of denial-of-service attacks, dropping all mes-
sages (which we refer to as black hole denial-of-service) and flooding the network with fake messages, re-
sult in similar network degradation [9]. This degradation does not cripple the network because malicious
nodes suffer from the same level of intermittent connectivity as non-malicious nodes. We have chosen to
consider the case of black hole DoS attacks. This is because EBR is a low-overhead quota-based protocol,
and hence extra flooding is not as big a concern as black holes. In quota-based protocols, non-malicious
nodes do not flood messages, real or fake, and should simply drop messages with a high number of copies,
since they are malicious.
To determine how vulnerable EBR is to black hole DoS attacks, we performed a series of simulations
where a certain percentage of the nodes are malicious. Malicious nodes always advertise an exceptionally
high encounter value, and immediately delete any message replicas obtained. Each data point is the aver-
age of 10 runs, and small 95% confidence intervals are shown. A vehicular mobility model is used, which is
explained, along with simulation parameters, further in Section 4.5. The results of this experiment, shown
in Figure 4.1, indicate that network performance can be hindered with a relatively small number of mali-
cious nodes. However, matching the work done by Burgess et. al, additional malicious nodes are not able
to cripple the network. These results indicate that it is necessary to provide an optional solution that pre-
vents DoS attacks. Users not minding the decrease in performance may choose not to implement this solu-
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Figure 4.2: Timestamp Protocol
tion. However, providing a solution is necessary for those users more concerned about maximizing network
performance. The penalty for choosing the solution is that there must exist a means of digitally signing
data as well as binding keys to identities, such as PKI.
The insight of the solution comes from the observation that an encounter value can never be altered
unless an external event (e.g., coming in contact with another node) occurs. Therefore, proving that the
encounter value was altered only during an external event assures other nodes that the node in question
is not individually faking the value. Now, of course, nodes can still collude to artificially inflate their en-
counter values; this case will be considered shortly. Note that the goal is to prevent the artificial increase,
not decrease, of encounter values.
The protocol works as follows. Assume node A comes in contact with node C, and node C wishes to
send data to node A. The goal is for node A to offer acceptable evidence to node C that the encounter
value is not forged. To give acceptable evidence for this, node A must keep a list of transactions in which
all previously encountered nodes digitally sign a time stamped message stating that “node A met me at
time T”. A graphical illustration of this is given in Figure 4.2. Node A can then offer all of these mes-
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sages to node C, and allow node C to recompute node A’s encounter value from scratch. If the recom-
puted value is equal to the value provided by node A, then node C can confidently transmit replicas to
node A.
It is possible, even probable, that inherently trustworthy nodes are present in the network. For in-
stance, in disaster recovery networks, police and emergency responders can be considered highly trust-
worthy entities. These nodes can be utilized to sign, or checkpoint, actual encounter values. This check-
pointing process allows a node to delete all previous transactions and simply start with the new, signed
encounter value. Checkpointing nodes verify the encounter value in the same fashion as mentioned above
and then provide a signed encounter value back to the node. Checkpointing nodes must be trusted by all
nodes in the network since previous transaction data is deleted after a signed encounter value is obtained
(e.g., a node is checkpointed by a checkpointing node).
It is possible for colluding nodes to artificially inflate each other’s encounter values by signing multi-
ple “fake” meeting messages. This is a difficult problem, and we have not discovered a clear-cut solution.
However, using statistical techniques, nodes diligent in looking for abnormal contact rates can mitigate
the damage. If a node legitimately meets another node or group of nodes very frequently, it can lessen its
chances of raising a false red flag by simply not storing some of the meetings, and not updating its en-
counter value for those meetings. A more thorough investigation of this is future work.
4.5 Evaluation
The primary goal of our evaluation is to show that EBR achieves a high message delivery ratio and good
latency, while maintaining extremely low overhead. To demonstrate this, we first present the metrics used
in our evaluation, followed by a brief description of the mobility models. Finally, we present a compre-
hensive evaluation of EBR in comparison to five other popular DTN routing protocols. To perform our
evaluation, we use the Opportunistic Network Environment simulator (ONE) [29], which is a simulation
environment designed specifically for disruption tolerant networks.
4.5.1 Metrics
Although traditional evaluation metrics provide a good understanding of the performance of a network,
the evaluation of many current DTN routing protocols is hindered by the limited, and sometimes mislead-
ing, metrics used. To give a clearer, more complete picture of the evaluation, we consider three traditional
performance metrics as well as introduce three composite metrics.
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Traditional performance metrics include average message delivery ratio (MDR) and end-to-end mes-
sage latency, while resource usage, or resource friendliness can be captured by goodput. Goodput is de-
fined as the number of messages delivered divided by the total number of messages transferred (including
those transfers that did not result in a delivery). In a resource constrained network, effective use of avail-
able storage can be captured by the number of messages dropped due to buffer overflows. We evaluated
this metric in all of our scenarios; however, since it closely correlates to goodput, those results were omit-
ted due to space constraints.
While these three traditional metrics provide a comprehensive view of the communication in DTNs,
many protocols trade off effectiveness in one metric for effectiveness in another. Composite metrics are
able to penalize protocols for performing poorly in individual primary metrics, giving a more complete pic-
ture of protocol performance. We consider three composite metrics to illustrate the relative relationship
between the primary metrics. The MDR x Average Delay metric takes MDR and penalizes it for having a
poor end-to-end delay, allowing for a more complete picture. Similarly, the MDR x Goodput metric looks
at MDR and penalizes it for having poor goodput, giving a view of the network stewardship along with
traditional MDR. Finally, the MDR x Average Delay x Goodput metric looks at MDR and penalizes it
both for poor average delay and poor goodput. It is important to note that the absolute value of compos-
ite metrics is more or less meaningless by itself, since the metrics are artificial in nature. Therefore, when
comparing protocols using composite metrics, one should consider the protocols’ relative performance to
one another. Further note that to maintain the standard of “higher is better”, average delay is always in-
verted when used in composite metrics.
4.5.2 Mobility Models
Since DTNs can operate in many different environments, we use three different mobility models in our
evaluation, specifically chosen to encompass a wide variety of DTN environments: a map-driven model
simulating a vehicular network, an event-driven model simulating a disaster scenario [35], and a tradi-
tional random waypoint (RWP) model.
The vehicular-based map-driven model, which is part of the ONE simulator, limits node movement
to actual streets found on an imported map, an approximate 5 km x 3 km section of downtown Helsinki,
Finland. Approximately 15% of the nodes were configured to follow pre-defined routes (like tram lines)
with speed between 7 and 10 m/s, the default for trams in the ONE simulator. The rest of the nodes were
divided into four groups of nodes and four groups of “points-of-interest” (POI). Each node group was as-
signed different probabilities of picking the next node from a particular group of POIs to simulate the phe-
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nomenon that people often visit certain areas of a city more frequently than others based on their profes-
sion, age and other factors. The speed of these nodes varied between 2.7 and 13.9 m/s, the default for car
simulation in ONE.
The role-based, event-driven disaster mobility model [35], presented in Chapter 2, captures distinct
movement patterns of roles as they react to external events. For this model, we simulate four equally spaced
disaster events and a hospital. 50% of the nodes are civilians that flee from the events, 25% are ambu-
lances that oscillate to and from events and a centrally located hospital, and 25% are police personnel who
at first gravitate towards an event, but then react by “patrolling” the area in a random walk fashion. Po-
lice and ambulances always travel between 17 and 20 m/s, unless stopped. Civilians always travel between
1 and 4 m/s, unless stopped.
Finally, we simulate the routing protocols with a traditional random waypoint model. For these sim-
ulations, nodes are relatively slow moving, since the disaster scenario and vehicular models are relatively
fast moving. Nodes move between 0.5 and 1.5 m/s, and pause at destinations for some time between 0
and 120 seconds.
For the disaster and random waypoint mobility models, the simulation area is 3 km by 3 km. For all
simulations, the transmission range of each node is 250 m.
4.5.3 Performance Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness of EBR, we perform two groups of simulations on each of the three mo-
bility models. To illustrate how each of the protocols reacts to changes in node density, we vary the num-
ber of nodes in the network starting at 26, followed by 51 to 251 in increments of 50, while keeping the
area constant. The extra node represents a hospital in the middle of the simulation area for the purpose
of the disaster scenario mobility model. To illustrate how each protocol reacts to varying network loads,
we vary the per-node offered load by adjusting the number of messages sent per minute per source from
1 (lower load), to 2 (medium load), to 4 (higher low). Following this comparative evaluation, we evaluate
how EBR reacts to changes in two local parameters: the popularity counter weighting constant (α) and
the number of initial replicas per message.
In all simulations, we keep the area constant, the packet size constant at 25 KB, and the buffer space
constant at 1 MB. Each simulation lasts for one simulated hour. Unless otherwise noted, each data point
is the average of at least 10 runs, with 95% confidence intervals displayed. Due to the large amount of
time required to simulate MaxProp in ONE, it was only evaluated fully for 26, 51, and 101 nodes, and
is the average of four runs for 151 nodes, and is not evaluated for higher numbers of nodes. MaxProp is
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omitted from the evaluation using the vehicular mobility model due to the large amount of time required
to simulate it.
Comparative Results
We evaluate EBR against five other popular protocols: (1) basic epidemic [55], (2) Prophet [32], (3) Spray
and Wait [51], (4) Spray and Focus [52], and (5) MaxProp [10]. To enable a comparison between EBR and
Spray and Focus, we implemented Spray and Focus to use an EBR-style encounter value (EV) to opti-
mize delivery ratios in the focus phase. When nodes running Spray and Focus are in the focus phase, they
hand-off single-copy messages to nodes with a higher EV.
First, we present the results from the vehicular mobility model. Note that MaxProp is not included
in this set of simulations due to the large amount of time necessary to simulate it on the ONE simulator.
EBR performs extremely well in terms of MDR, compared to the other quota-based protocols, Spray and
Wait and Spray and Focus (see Figure 4.3(a)). Two factors account for this. First, the mobility model fits
perfectly into the assumptions of EBR, namely that past information on rate-of-encounters is a good esti-
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mator for future rate-of-encounters. Second, the network utilization seems to be correlated to MDR in this
scenario, most likely due to constrained buffer space. EBR is, by far, the most resource friendly, as shown
by the goodput metric (see Figure 4.4). While EBR seems to have unfavorable delay, this is, in part, due
to a high MDR (see Figure 4.3(b)). Since delay is computed only over messages that have been delivered,
it is deceptive to view delay alone since many protocols quickly deliver messages that take a small num-
ber of hops, and do not deliver most high-hop messages. The composite metrics, showing a more complete
picture, further illustrate the power of EBR.
Second, we present the results from the disaster mobility model. As expected, in terms of MDR, Max-
Prop performs the best (see Figure 4.7(a)), due to its aggressive use of network resources. Closely fol-
lowing is EBR, which is never greater than 9 percentage points away from MaxProp. This is significant
since EBR is much less demanding on network resources, yet can achieve a comparable MDR. Spray and
Wait, which performs closest to EBR in terms of goodput (yet still significantly worse), performs notice-
ably worse in MDR. The reason EBR performs much better than Spray and Wait is due to the role-based
characteristics of the disaster scenario mobility model. Both ambulances and police are highly active,
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more-so than civilians, and so EBR’s assumption about predicting the rate of encounters using past data
holds true. Furthermore, the goodput is significantly higher using EBR because if a large number of copies
reach a high-encounter node, that node will not forward many of these copies to low-encounter nodes.
This helps keep the network resource usages much lower than Spray and Wait. Note that both Prophet
and Epidemic collapse as the number of nodes increases. In terms of latency, MaxProp performs worst,
whereas Spray and Focus performs expectedly well (see Figure 4.7(b)).
Finally, the random waypoint model is considered. In terms of MDR (see Figure 4.9(a)), the gap be-
tween EBR and Spray and Wait is closer than with the disaster scenario (notice the change in scale). How-
ever, as the number of nodes increases, the gap becomes larger. The sudden increase at 50 to 100 nodes is
due to the density finally becoming adequate for good delivery. Past this point, there is a minor decrease
in performance for EBR, Spray and Wait and Spray and Focus and a more dramatic decrease for Prophet
and Epidemic. We believe the poor performance of MaxProp is due to the relatively small buffer size. In
terms of latency, Spray and Focus again performs the best (see Figure 4.9(b)); however, EBR consistently
performs better than MaxProp. As expected, goodput strongly favors EBR.
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In the second group of simulations, the offered load is varied from 1 to 2 to 4 messages per source per
minute. Due to space constraints, we only present results for the disaster mobility model and random
waypoint model. Additionally, we only include the results for MDR, delay and the three-way composite
metric. For the disaster scenario, MaxProp and EBR perform expectedly well, with all protocols suffering
as the offered load increases (see Figure 4.11(a)). The average latency, however, shows MaxProp perform-
ing much worse than other metrics (see Figure 4.11(b)). Furthermore, as the offer load is increased from
1 to 4 messages per source per minute, EBR performs better than both Prophet and Epidemic. This is
due to EBR’s sharper drop in MDR as offer load increases. Spray and Focus and Spray and Wait perform
the best, as expected. When combining all primary metrics, EBR performs at a high level, and the gap
between EBR and Spray and Wait does not quickly close (see Figure 4.12).
When the offered load is varied using the RWP mobility model, the MaxProp data is averaged over
three runs, with all other data averaged over ten runs. Due to the more uniform nature of per node rate
of encounters, EBR does not perform as well as it does in the disaster scenario mobility model. However,
in terms of MDR, it is still in the top tier, and performs higher than all others with lower offered loads
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Figure 4.12: Disaster: Varying load - MDR x Average Delay(AD) x Goodput
(see Figure 4.13(a)). In terms of latency, as the offered load increases, the gaps between protocols tends to
close (see Figure 4.13(b)). Finally, when combining all primary metrics, we notice that EBR performs at
the highest level, primarily due to low overhead, and reasonable MDR and latency (see Figure 4.14).
EBR Parameter Results
To determine how EBR reacts to changes in internal parameters, we evaluate EBR against itself using dif-
ferent parameter settings. Due to space constraints, we only present results for the disaster scenario mo-
bility model and only vary the number of nodes in the system. To evaluate the impact of the weight of
the current rate of encounter in the EV counter, we vary α from 0.5 to 0.85. Additionally, to capture the
tradeoff between resource usage and delay, we vary the starting number of message copies between 5, 11,
and 20. Therefore, a total of 6 lines are shown per graph. Again, due to space constraints, we only present
the graphs for the primary metrics, not the composite metrics.
In terms of MDR, α does not make a substantial difference. However, the number of initial copies
does. As the number of nodes grows larger, EBR using only 5 copies starts to perform best, with EBR
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using 11 copies within a few percentage points (see Figure 4.15(a)). However, in terms of average delay,
EBR using 5 copies performs significantly worse than with both 11 and 20 copies (see Figure 4.15(b)).
Again, changing the value of α has little effect. The goodput is significantly greater when the number of
copies is small, as expected (see Figure 4.16). In total, when not considering latency, a small number of
copies, such as 5, allows for good performance of EBR. However, when latency is considered, a bit of a
trade off must be made. Therefore, we have chosen to compromise and recommend a value of 11 initial
copies as default to EBR.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
The ability to efficiently and effectively route data through intermittently connected networks is of criti-
cal importance to DTNs. Many current routing protocols utilize flooding-based techniques to obtain rel-
atively high message delivery ratios. This, however, comes at the expense of overwhelming network re-
sources, mainly bandwidth and storage. Resource outages then lead to reduced performance in clustered
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areas, due to congestion, as well as energy strain on the devices. Filling all available buffer space with
message replicas can hinder an application’s ability to store local data. Additionally, overloading the net-
work channel hinders one-hop protocols that do not rely on routing. Unfortunately, protocols that allow
for low network resource utilization generally are not able to obtain comparable delivery ratios. We have
shown that basing routing decisions on the encounter rate of a node can increase the delivery ratio. Our
Encounter-Based Routing protocol (EBR) provides comparable or better message delivery ratios than cur-
rent flooding-based protocols, while maintaining extremely low resource utilization.
There are many interesting future directions for encounter-based routing. First, it would be useful to
evaluate EBR using probabilistic splitting rules, as described in Section 4.3.2. More specifically, to analyze
the MDR, average latency, and goodput tradeoffs when the variance of the number of replicas is increased
for all nodes, as well as when the variance is non-uniform for all nodes. Following this, one could explore,
both mathematically and experimentally, distributions other than Gaussian. A second future direction is
exploring the effects of using a second order derivative in terms of number of encounters. Currently, EBR
only considers the current rate of encounters and averages this rate using an exponentially weighted av-
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erage to account for both older and newer data. If EBR used a second order derivative, it would consider
the change in rate of encounters over time and this trend could be used to distribute an appropriate num-
ber of message replicas.
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Chapter 5
Achieving Anycast in DTNs by
Enhancing Existing Unicast Protocols
Many DTN environments, such as emergency response networks and pocket-switched networks, are based
on human mobility and communication patterns, which naturally lead to groups. In these scenarios, group-
based communication is central, and hence a natural and useful routing paradigm is anycast, where a
node attempts to communicate with at least one member of a particular group. Unfortunately, most ex-
isting anycast solutions assume connectivity, and the few specifically for DTNs are single-copy in nature
and have only been evaluated in highly limited mobility models. In this chapter, we propose a protocol-
independent method of enhancing a large number of existing DTN unicast protocols, giving them the abil-
ity to perform anycast communication. This method requires no change to the unicast protocols them-
selves and instead changes their world view by adding a thin layer beneath the routing layer. Through a
thorough set of simulations, we also evaluate how different parameters and network conditions affect the
performance of these newly transformed anycast protocols.
5.1 Anycast Motivation and Challenges
As mobile, wireless devices increase in popularity, intermittent connectivity becomes the norm. Robust
communication to and from these devices requires protocols that are disruption tolerant by nature, with
little reliance on static infrastructure. The natural communication patterns of these disruption tolerant
networks (DTNs) differ from traditional Internet-based communication in that their structure is derived
from node interaction and mobility. Furthermore, these networks can be highly heterogeneous and include
smart phones, sensors, laptops, and even vehicles. Despite this heterogeneity, the historical Internet-style
design principle of point-to-point communication (e.g., unicast) has dominated the DTN realm, severely
hindering what could be a rich and diverse medium for new applications.
DTNs are critical to supporting environments that are human-centric by nature, such as emergency
response, social networking and community networks [13]. The key interesting feature is that the com-
munication supported in these networks is based on group-based human interaction [13, 49]. Such groups
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can be geographic in nature, such as all the people on the same bus; social in nature, such as friends using
mobile devices; or role-based, such as firefighters or police officers [35]. While user-based communication
is naturally supported by network-level unicast communication, this group-based communication is more
naturally supported by anycast, where communication with at least one member of a particular group is
considered a success.
Two examples help illustrate the benefits of anycast communication in DTNs. First, in emergency re-
sponse networks composed of groups such as police officers, ambulances, and civilians, group communica-
tion clearly trumps individual communication. A civilian is more likely to request the help of any police
officer rather than a particular one. Similarly, police officers are more likely to request any ambulance, as
opposed to a specific one. Second, in community DTN networks, which may be a composition of pedes-
trian social networks, vehicular networks, and local bus networks, group communication can also be very
useful. As buses become equipped with Internet-able gateways, individual cars on the road would have in-
centive to contact any bus, instead of a specific one, for its gateway capability. Furthermore, pedestrians
may be more interested in using the network to call for any cab, as opposed to a specific one. Interest-
ingly, anycast can also be useful for enhancing unicast in DTNs. Essentially, smarter unicast routing pro-
tocols can be designed to contact nodes geographically affiliated with a target destination node as a first
step towards contacting the target node itself [25].
The goal of anycast routing is to reach at least one node (the specific one does not matter) in a par-
ticular group. In connected environments, basic anycast routing techniques are relatively straightforward,
since messages can be unicast to a particular node in the group that has the lowest cost (i.e., quickest re-
sponse) [8, 41]. This technique, however, does not work in disconnected environments, since it is extremely
difficult to predict which of the nodes of the group would even get the message, let alone be able to re-
spond the fastest. In such a disconnected and unpredictable environment, anycast protocols must instead
be smarter and attempt to truly reach any node in the group. While existing routing techniques for DTNs
seem to lend themselves well to supporting anycast routing, current approaches to anycast in DTNs are
very limited in scope, focusing on single-copy routing and/or targeted for highly constrained mobility pat-
terns [20, 14, 25].
Current DTN routing protocols [34, 32, 10, 4, 52] are built on top of two key mechanisms: direct de-
livery, to support one-hop communication, and utility-based forwarding, to help guide messages to their
destinations. Although both of these mechanisms can be used to support anycast routing, current uni-
cast protocols are designed to route to a specific node as a destination and not to a group. The goal of
the research presented in this chapter is to investigate the use of these mechanisms in an anycast setting
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and how they need to be adapted to support groups as destinations. Additionally, we take this one step
further and present a protocol-independent anycast layer that exposes group information in a meaningful
way to unicast routing protocols, enabling these protocols to run unmodified to support anycast routing.
If existing unicast protocols can be adapted to work in an anycast scenario, users could take advantage
of a wide array of existing protocols that have been fine-tuned and thoroughly evaluated in many envi-
ronments. These newly enhanced protocols could also be evaluated under a wide range of parameters and
network conditions.
The main contributions of the research presented in this chapter are three-fold. First, we explore the
mechanisms used in current DTN routing protocols and show how these mechanisms can be adapted to al-
low for anycast communication. Second, using these modified mechanisms, we present a protocol-independent
anycast layer that allows current unicast protocols to run unmodified in an anycast mode. Third, we ex-
plore how the resulting anycast protocols perform in various environments, and specifically what features
of an environment should guide a user in which anycast protocol to choose. We show that the choice is
actually different in the anycast case, as opposed to the unicast case, since there are more factors to take
into account. In particular, we show that important factors when choosing an anycast protocol include
group size, resource constraints and mobility levels, and the presence of an acknowledgment scheme. Inter-
estingly, the presence of a back channel (free and quick intra-group communication) does not have a major
impact on the selected metrics.
5.2 Approaches to Group-based Communication
In group-based DTN scenarios, anycast can be used as the core routing paradigm. While there exists any-
cast solutions for connected environments [8, 41], these solutions all rely on stable end-to-end connectivity.
In other words, they work under the assumption that the network allows for select group members to be
reliably contacted and cannot be easily adapted to the disconnected and heavily partitioned environments
found in DTNs. The challenge in disconnected and unpredictable environments is that anycast solutions
cannot simply pick the “best” group member according to some metric and then use unicast techniques
to reach it. Instead, they must take a group-based view where groups are the destination, not individual
nodes.
The key to achieving anycast in DTNs lies in exposing knowledge of the groups in the network to the
routing protocol, and having the routing protocol directly act on that knowledge. Similar to unicast pro-
tocols, anycast protocols can use single- or multi-copy techniques. In single-copy approaches, messages
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are either held until the destination is met (e.g., direct delivery) or forwarded through intermediate nodes
via a utility metric. While single-copy techniques work in some environments, they are unreliable in un-
predictable DTN environments, since even the best guesses at which node to forward to are often wrong.
Unfortunately, there has been little work on anycast in DTNs, all of which focuses on single-copy routing.
One attempt at anycast routing in DTNs explores the problem by evaluating different routing metrics for
selecting forwarding nodes [20]. However, this approach only analyzes single-copy routing. Furthermore,
nodes are all stationary, with the exception of a few mobile nodes that act as message carriers, presenting
a very constrained environment for evaluation. A second anycast technique, also using single-copy routing,
attempts to utilize genetic algorithms to explore route decisions [14]. This work, however, assumes all mo-
bility, including future mobility, is deterministic and known ahead of time, which is not a good assumption
in most DTNs.
One DTN unicast protocol that incorporates elements of grouping is BubbleRAP [25]. This is a social-
based forwarding method that first attempts to send messages to the destination’s local community, which
then can more effectively send the message to the actual destination. Nodes carry around a global rank-
ing, determining how “central” they are to the network, and a local ranking, determining how central they
are to their local community, which are used as hints to reach the destination node. However, BubbleRAP
is designed for improving unicast, not anycast, and is inherently a single-copy technique and so is limited
by the same problems as other single-copy approaches for anycast in DTNs.
It is worth noting that the related concept of multicast in DTNs, where the goal is to deliver a copy of
the message to every member of the destination group, has briefly been considered. One simulation study,
where no new protocols were proposed, considered existing multi-copy unicast routing protocols in a mul-
ticast context [3]. The simulation results of existing protocols were interesting. However, these results do
not apply to anycast scenarios since the end goals are very different. Most specifically, a primary result
was to include a considerable amount of redundancy to reach all group members. This would not hold
true in anycast scenarios, where only one member need be reached.
Similar to unicast protocols, anycast in DTNs can benefit from managed replication. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to directly use the multitude of currently available multi-copy DTN unicast protocols for
anycast, since they do not have a group-based view of the world and operate on individual nodes. How-
ever, given our goal of deploying unmodified unicast protocols on top of an anycast layer, it is useful to
discuss a few of the most relevant protocols. Current multi-copy unicast protocols can be characterized
into two main groups, flooding-based protocols and quota-based protocols [34]. Flooding-based protocols,
such as epidemic [55], Prophet [32], MaxProp [10], and RAPID [4], do not attempt to put a hard limit on
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the number of times a message can replicate, and instead focus on smart buffer management and trans-
mission ordering techniques to handle the potentially large number of replicas in the network. These pro-
tocols are more appropriate for environments not heavily constrained by limited resources. Quota-based
protocols (e.g., Spray and Wait [51], Spray and Focus [52], and EBR [34]), on the other hand, set a hard
limit on the number of times a message is allowed to replicate. Limited replication is guaranteed by at-
taching a quota to every message that indicates the number of replicas the message can split into in the
future. The quota is split during each replication and a new quota is carried around with each replica, en-
suring the total number of replicas of a particular message never exceeds the original quota for the mes-
sage. These protocols are more suitable for resource-constrained environments.
While there unfortunately is a lack of effective DTN anycast protocols, it is important to note that
there is a wide range of unicast protocols, each suited for different types of environments. Given the diver-
sity of both DTN environments and DTN unicast routing protocols, it would be advantageous to be able
to utilize these protocols for anycast routing. We next discuss which of the routing mechanisms commonly
found in unicast protocols can be used for anycast and how they need to be modified to support groups as
destinations.
5.3 Enabling Anycast in DTNs
Anycast, like other DTN routing protocols, needs mechanisms to guide replication, forwarding, and buffer
management decisions. In this section, we show how common mechanisms found in unicast routing pro-
tocols can be adapted for anycast use. In particular, we show that a thin, protocol-independent anycast
layer sitting directly below the routing layer can allow a wide-range of unicast protocols to run unmodified
in anycast mode. In addition, we present a new DTN routing architecture that accounts for both unicast
and anycast routing.
5.3.1 Group Management
One of the main requirements for anycast communication is access to information about group member-
ship. Essentially, there must be a means of informing the routing protocol which groups the current con-
tact belongs to. Such a group management component may store a nodeID-to-group table in memory, and
update that table as it receives new group information. A simple approach to group management lets each
node carry its own group information throughout the network [25]. While sufficient for the discussions
in this chapter, such approaches are inherently susceptible to malicious attacks on the group member-
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ship lists. A complex and robust form of group management is MembersOnly [37], which we presented in
Chapter 3.
5.3.2 Routing Mechanisms
Most current DTN routing protocols perform two steps during a given contact opportunity: direct deliv-
ery, which supports one-hop delivery of messages, and utility-based forwarding, which guides messages and
replicas towards their destination. These two steps can be enhanced to support a group-based view, in-
stead of a node-based view, enabling anycast routing. Current protocols that follow this two-step process
include Direct Delivery (with a non-existing utility step), Prophet, MaxProp, RAPID, and Spray and Fo-
cus (a follow-up protocol to Spray and Wait).
Direct delivery (referred to as DD) supports one-hop delivery of messages, where if the node has a
message destined for the contact, that message is immediately transmitted to the contact. DD works by
checking every message’s destination ID against the contact node ID, as provided by the network layer. If
the destination ID matches the contact node’s ID, that message is immediately forwarded to the contact.
To support anycast, DD must instead check every message’s destination ID (which, in the case of anycast
is a group ID) against groups that the contact is a member of. To support this, anycast routing proto-
cols must obtain both a node ID from the network layer and a corresponding group ID from the group
management component. If the destination ID matches any of the group IDs, that message is immediately
forwarded to the contact.
After all messages destined for the contact are delivered, the protocol switches to the utility step (re-
ferred to as Utility). Based on the contact, a utility function is computed or looked up, and used to decide
which, if any, of the stored messages to replicate, which order to send messages, and which order to drop
messages. For unicast protocols, these utilities are node-based ; every node the protocol knows about has
a utility attached to it. An example utility is the probability of meeting a particular node. Utility values
are updated either periodically or when contacts occur. Similar to DD, Utility can be adapted to support
anycast by using group-based utility values where all routing policies work on groups instead of nodes. In
other words, each node stores utilities for all groups, not individual nodes, that they are aware of. This,
in essence, transforms groups into virtual nodes from the node’s perspective. When a contact occurs, the
node updates the utility for the contact’s group(s) instead of the contact’s actual node ID. This enables
the routing protocols to capture mobility characteristics (such as meeting frequency) of groups instead of
individual nodes.
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5.3.3 Protocol Independent Anycast Layer
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the identification and modification of two commonly used
routing techniques in DTNs, namely DD and Utility, can allow most current unicast protocols to oper-
ate in an anycast mode. Essentially, any unicast protocol that follows the two-step process can easily be
adapted to support anycast. When the DD and Utility steps for a unicast protocol are transformed into
their anycast counterparts (DD-A and Utility-A), the protocol’s view of the world turns from node-based
to group-based. While it is useful to know how to perform these transformations, it would also be bene-
ficial to support anycast without modifying the unicast protocols at all. Since both DD-A and Utility-A
work on group IDs instead of node IDs, it is possible to simply present a group view of the network to a
unicast routing protocol, and have that protocol work as if it were an anycast protocol. The group view
layer (GV layer) takes both the node ID from the network layer and the corresponding group ID from
the group management component, and passes the group ID to the protocol in the node ID field. This
presents a view to the routing protocol where every group is actually a virtual node, and every time a
member of that group is encountered, it is like that single virtual node was encountered. This view com-
bined with DD and Utility is equivalent to DD-A and Utility-A, enabling the unicast protocols to run in
anycast mode unchanged.
5.3.4 Building a New DTN Routing Architecture
To properly integrate our anycast layer, we now describe a network architecture for DTNs that incorpo-
rates both unicast and anycast routing. Routing in DTNs has traditionally been unicast in nature, and
therefore the network layer simply passed raw contact information to the unicast protocol, which then ap-
propriately routes application data. However, anycast in DTNs require a slightly more complex architec-
ture, since group IDs must be relayed to the routing protocol in addition to simple contact information.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a DTN network architecture, focusing on routing, that incorporates both any-
cast and unicast capabilities. Note that there are two primary tracks that lead up and down the stack:
the anycast track and the unicast track. The unicast track is identical to before, the network and appli-
cation layer can directly interact with the unicast routing protocol. The anycast track includes the group
management component directly above the network layer. This allows both the node IDs of the current
contacts, as well as their respective groups, to be passed to the anycast routing protocol. More specifically,
the network layer passes node ID information about each of the nodes currently in communication range
to the group management component. This group management component then looks up the correspond-
ing group ID for each node ID, and attaches that information. This pairing is then sent either directly to
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Figure 5.1: Architecture
the anycast routing protocol (the left side of the anycast track), or to the GV layer (the right side of the
anycast track). The GV Layer, presenting a group-centric view of the world, indicates to the routing pro-
tocol which groups it is in contact with by substituting group IDs for the node ID fields. This gives the
illusion that an entire group is actually a single (virtual) node, and allows many unicast protocols to run
unmodified.
5.4 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is to explore the behavior of the anycast adapted versions of a few representa-
tive unicast DTN routing protocols in different environments. These evaluations can then help determine
which protocol should be use in which DTN environment. In general, unicast DTN protocols are affected
by characteristics such as resource constraints, mobility levels and acknowledgments. However, anycast
scenarios are also affected by other characteristics such as group size and group back channel availabil-
ity (i.e., whether group nodes can communicate via an out-of-band back channel). We evaluate how both
the traditional unicast characteristics as well as new anycast characteristics affect the transformed anycast
protocols.
Our results show that the most important network characteristics for anycast protocols are group size,
resource constraints, mobility levels, and the presence of an acknowledgment scheme. Interestingly, the
presence of a back channel does not have a major impact on the selected metrics. Where acknowledgments
can flush out already delivered messages, a back channel simply allows instantaneous intra-group com-
munication, and can be used as a means to increase the spread of acknowledgment messages. Essentially,
once one member of the group obtains a message, it can then use the back channel to instruct all of its
other group members to flood out an acknowledgment for the message just received.
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5.4.1 Anycast Protocols
In our evaluation, we include representatives of different classes of single- and multi-copy DTN routing,
including flooding- and quota-based protocols, each of which was implemented in the ONE simulator [29].
Using the protocol-independent anycast layer, the flooding-based Prophet [32] becomes Prophet-A and the
quota-based Spray and Focus [52] becomes Spray and Focus-A, where the focus function is time since last
meeting the destination (i.e., the group). Note that, for Spray and Focus, the initial quota was set to 11,
which allows a good trade-off of resource usage and performance. In addition, we include a direct delivery
anycast protocol (DD-A), as well as a pure epidemic protocol (Epidemic-A). Finally, we included an opti-
mized epidemic approach where bandwidth is unlimited and message sizes are negligible (EpidemicOracle-
A). This gives an upper bound on what anycast protocols can hope to achieve. Note that Epidemic-A
by itself does not give optimal performance since there is no guiding factor in which messages to trans-
mit first. In many cases, Epidemic-A may choose the “wrong message”, which in turn does not allow the
“right message” to be sent before the contact is broken. In addition to the anycast layer, we implemented
two additional features that can be turned on and off: flooded acknowledgments and group back channel
connectivity. These features allow us to explore in-depth the network characteristics that affect anycast
performance.
Note that there is no additional overhead, outside of what is incurred by the group management com-
ponent, in these enhanced protocols. In fact, many of the protocols store less data, since the number of
utility values is decreased in the enhanced version.
5.4.2 Metrics and Simulation Environment
The first, and primary, metric used for the evaluation is message delivery ratio (MDR), which is the ratio
of total messages sent divided by total messages received. Due to the intermittently connected environ-
ment, not all messages sent will be delivered, and hence this metric gives important information about a
routing protocol’s effectiveness. The second metric is average delay of delivered messages, which is the av-
erage end-to-end delay over all delivered messages. This metric indicates how quickly routing protocols
can deliver messages, which is important since many messages lose relevance after being delayed for a long
period of time. This metric is more meaningful if the MDR’s of all protocols being compared are similar,
since only delivered messages are included. The third and final metric is average overhead ratio, which is
the total number of transmissions divided by the total number of received messages. Intuitively, this ratio
indicates the average number of transmissions required for each message delivered, giving an indication of
resource use. The lower the overhead ratio, the less strain there is on network resources (battery life, net-
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work bandwidth, etc.). This is an important metric to indicate the “resource-friendliness” of the protocols.
All simulations were run in the ONE [29] simulator using the built-in community mobility model. This
model simulates the movement of pedestrians, cars, and buses in the city of Helsinki, Finland. In all sim-
ulations, there are a total of 126 nodes: 80 pedestrians traveling between 0.5 and 1.5 meters per second,
40 cars traveling either between 2.7 and 13.9 meters per second (around 10 to 50 km per hour) in the nor-
mal case or between 2.7 and 3 meters per second in the slow case, and 6 buses traveling between 7 and 10
meters per second. This allows for an appropriate density to evaluate DTN protocols. All nodes can trans-
mit at a distance of 100m and speed of 2Mbps, except two of the buses, equipped with high-speed inter-
faces, which can transmit at a distance of 1000m and a speed of 10Mbps. The nodes choose a location to
move to with weighted probabilities (with real Helsinki hotspots being given higher probability), wait for
a random amount of time between 0 and 120 seconds, and then repeat. All simulations are run for 4000
seconds, the world size is 4.5km x 3.4km, and node buffer sizes are 5MB. All data points are an average of
10 runs with a surrounding 95% confidence interval.
Nodes 0 to 39 are pedestrians, 40 to 79 are cars, 80 to 119 are pedestrians, and 120 to 125 are buses.
In these scenarios, groups are simply chosen sequentially, and are disjoint. For instance, if the group size
is 8, then nodes 0 to 7 are in group 0, 8 to 15 are in group 1, etc. This helps keep similar types of nodes
in the same group (for example, pedestrians that have a high probability of visiting a particular hotspot),
while at the same time allowing for a straightforward way of experimenting with different group sizes.
5.4.3 Performance Evaluation
The goal of this evaluation is to determine how different factors affect the transformed anycast proto-
cols. The simulations are divided into two groups, a resource-constrained (RC) environment and a non-
resource-constrained (Non-RC) environment. Group sizes are evaluated at 1 (which is equivalent to uni-
cast), 2, 4, 8, and 16. Evaluation across this range indicates how anycast protocols perform when moving
away from unicast and towards larger group sizes. For each set of simulations, the availability of acknowl-
edgments and the availability of a back channel to help spread acknowledgments faster are both consid-
ered. There are three configurations: (1) no ACKs and no back channel, (2) ACKs and no back channel,
and (3) ACKs and a back channel.
Resource-Constrained
In this set of simulations, the transformed anycast protocols attempt to deliver messages in a resource-
constrained environment. Message sizes vary between 500k and 1M, and a message is generated by a ran-
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Figure 5.2: RC, no acks, no back channel (a) MDR, (b) Delay
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Figure 5.3: RC, no acks, no back channel - Overhead
dom node every 25 to 35 seconds, destined to a random group. In this scenario, cars are traveling at nor-
mal speeds (2.7 to 13.9 meters per second, as previously mentioned).
With no acknowledgments and no access to a back channel (see Figure 5.2), anycast behavior is ac-
tually quite different than unicast behavior. In a unicast environment (when the group size is 1), quota-
based protocols (e.g., Spray and Focus-A) perform only slightly better than smart flooding-based proto-
cols (e.g., Prophet). However, the gap between quota-based protocols and flooding-based protocols be-
comes much larger as the group size increases (as shown in Figure 5.2 (a)). With larger groups, it gets
increasingly easy to meet a group member, and hence limiting replication is not hurting the network. In
this resource-constrained environment, flooding-based protocols (particularly Epidemic-A) quickly over-
whelm resources (as shown in Figure 5.3) to the extent that only a small fraction of buffered messages
are transmitted during every brief contact opportunity. This indicates that group size is very important
for protocol performance. Another surprising result is that as group size increases, DD-A actually per-
forms as well as Prophet-A, although Prophet-A still unsurprisingly delivers messages quicker (as shown
in Figure 5.2 (b)). This is because nodes running DD-A are able to eventually meet most groups when
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Figure 5.4: RC, acks, no back channel (a) MDR, (b) Delay
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Figure 5.5: RC, acks, no back channel - Overhead
group sizes are large, without causing any strain on resources (no message drops, not as much worrying
about contact duration, very little congestion, etc.). Overall, quota-based protocols are recommended in
resource-constrained environments, particularly if group sizes are large and there is reasonable mobility.
Next, consider the presence of acknowledgments, but the lack of back channel access, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.4. It is immediately clear that acknowledgments drastically improve the performance of flooding-
based protocols since these protocols, including Epidemic-A and Prophet-A, consume the most resources,
to the point that they are near optimal, along with Spray and Focus-A, when the group size is above 8 (as
shown in Figure 5.4(a)). Quota-based protocols are slightly improved, and DD-A is not improved at all
since there is already a limit of at most 1 copy of every message in the network. Average delay also de-
creases slightly for all protocols. In terms of overhead, a significant improvement is seen, since wasteful
transmissions (e.g., messages that have already been delivered) are minimized. As expected, the overhead
ratio is much lower, especially for flooding-based protocols (as shown in Figure 5.5)
Finally, consider the presence of an acknowledgment scheme and back channel access. In other words,
if a group member receives a message destined for their group, that member immediately informs all other
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Figure 5.6: RC, ack, back channel (a) MDR, (b) Delay
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Figure 5.7: RC, ack, back channel - Overhead
group members to transmit ACKs for that particular message. Interestingly, access to a back channel does
not bring a significant improvement to any metric, as shown in Figure 5.6. This is because back channel
access is expected to have the most effect when group sizes are large (since there are more nodes to ini-
tially spread ACKs), but when group sizes are large and ACKs are used, all protocols perform at a high
level and hence the back channel ACKs do not help much.
Non-Resource-Constrained
In this set of simulations, the transformed anycast protocols attempt to deliver messages in a non-resource-
constrained environment. Message sizes vary between 50k and 100k, and a message is generated by a ran-
dom node every 50 to 70 seconds, destined to a random group. Furthermore, cars travel much slower (hence,
contact time is less of a resource constraint) at speeds of between 2.7 and 3 meters per second, which also
has the effect of allowing less node mixing. In addition to the first set, this helps us see how protocols re-
act to different ends of the resource spectrum.
As before, we first consider the scenario where there are no acknowledgments and no back channel
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Figure 5.8: Non-RC, no acks, no back channel (a) MDR, (b) Delay
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Figure 5.9: Non-RC, no acks, no back channel - Overhead
access (see Figure 5.8). What is immediately clear is that flooding-based protocols perform better than
quota-based protocols in both MDR and average delay, particularly when group sizes are small, which
mirrors unicast observations. This is because their flooding-based approach is appropriate in less resource-
constrained environments, since adding extra messages to the network is more helpful than harmful when
the messages are smaller and message production is less frequent. Furthermore, the reduced mobility al-
lows less node mixing, which hinders quota-based protocols since many of the replicas may stay clustered
together. One very interesting observation that differs from unicast behavior, is that after group sizes be-
come reasonably large, the MDR difference between flooding and quota based protocols is almost neg-
ligible. This is because it is relatively easy to meet groups, even in lower mobility environments, when
they are large and hence both types of protocols can perform well. In terms of delay, Epidemic-A per-
forms best, as expected, with the flooding and quota-based protocols performing similarly. However, all
are similar with large group sizes (16 or greater). Overhead results are as expected, with Epidemic-A and
Prophet-A being the least resource-friendly and Spray and Focus-A being extremely resource-friendly.
Therefore, if resources such as battery life or buffer size are severely limited, quota-based protocols are
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Figure 5.11: Non-RC, acks, no back channel - Overhead
the best choice.
It is important to note that overhead cannot be compared to the first set of simulations, and must be
compared only in a relative fashion between protocols in the second set of simulations. Due to the mes-
sage sizes being much smaller in this second set, many more transmissions per contact occur, meaning the
overhead ratios for the protocols are much greater in this set than the first. However, this does not mean
that the resource utilization is greater, since the message sizes are much smaller.
The second case shows the results when an acknowledgment scheme is added to the protocols, but
there are no back channels. Interestingly, this does not significantly affect either the MDR or the delay
metrics, as shown in Figure 5.10. This is due to the low resource utilization to start with, and hence, free-
ing up the resources does not significantly impact the performance. It does, however, have a very large
effect in terms of overhead. Prophet-A and Epidemic-A have their overhead significantly lowered, since
many extra and useless transmissions are eliminated. For the same reasons as in the first set of simula-
tions, adding a back channel for each group does not significantly change any of the metrics, as shown in
Figure 5.12.
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5.5 Conclusions and Future Directions
Groups are fundamental entities in many human-centric DTN environments, making effective and efficient
anycast communication important. In this chapter, we have proposed an overarching approach that allows
many current DTN unicast protocols to be enhanced to support anycast communication. It is shown that
this approach can be protocol-independent, and hence is implemented in a thin shim beneath the rout-
ing layer, essentially changing the world view of the protocol. Using this approach, we were able to en-
hance many popular unicast routing protocols, including flooding-based protocols such as Prophet and
epidemic, and quota-based protocols such as Spray and Focus. A thorough simulation-based evaluation
of these newly enhanced protocols indicates that many factors, such as group size, the presence of an ac-
knowledgment scheme, and the resource-constraints of the environment have a significant impact on any-
cast performance.
There are many avenues to be explored in future work. First, using the knowledge learned from the
evaluation presented, one could specifically create anycast protocols from scratch and evaluate them against
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the enhanced unicast protocols. Second, it would be interesting to explore the idea of what we refer to as
preferred anycast, where the goal is to reach any member of a particular group, but it would be preferred
to reach a specific subset of that group. This brings the idea of hierarchy into play.
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Chapter 6
Exploring Dynamic Manycast in
DTNs
In this chapter, we further support the concept of group-based communication in DTNs by exploring the
paradigm of manycast routing, where the goal is to meet k members of a group of size m. This very gen-
eral paradigm inherently includes other group-based routing concepts such as anycast and multicast. Ef-
ficiently handling manycast requests at the routing layer allows for both feasible and flexible manycast
applications. Our manycast exploration takes a three pronged approach. First, the relative difficulty of
manycast requests is quantified via analysis, which greatly deepens our theoretical knowledge of how chal-
lenging the general paradigm is in a DTN environment. Second, to understand how different replication-
based classes of DTN routing protocols respond to and handle manycast requests, extensive simulations
are performed in multiple types of network environments. These results show that any DTN manycast
protocol must dynamically react on a per-message basis by dynamically changing their routing approach
to achieve maximum results. Third, using the conclusions drawn from the analysis and simulation results,
we present a DTN manycast meta-protocol that selects the appropriate routing technique based on the
current request and network conditions.
6.1 The Importance of Manycast
As the previous chapters illustrate, group-based communication is critically important to human-centric
DTNs, since groups are a fundamental element in the structure of human mobility and communication.
Unfortunately, unicast communication has so dominated the Internet that group-based communication
paradigms, like anycast and multicast, are difficult to implement effectively. However, DTNs have given
us a clean slate with a very different underlying structure. Given the intermittent connectivity expected
in DTNs, communication is typically supported by some type of message replication, which naturally en-
ables many non-unicast communication paradigms, as shown in the previous chapter. Essentially, with
multiple replicas of a message, multiple destinations can be reached, enabling group-based communication,
like anycast, multicast and broadcast. However, it is very important not to be biased by the demands of
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Internet-based applications when considering group-based communication in human-centric DTNs. Tra-
ditional multicast, where all members of a group are guaranteed to receive the same messages, is not only
difficult in DTNs, but may not even be the correct approach.
Instead of forcing one communication paradigm on all DTN applications, it is interesting to consider
the whole space of communication as captured by the concept of manycast, where the end goal is to reach
some k out of the m members of a group. In essence, manycast can be thought of as an umbrella paradigm
that spans the space of single-endpoint and group-based communication simply by specifying the size of
the group and/or the size of the recipient pool. For example, manycast can be configured to achieve any-
cast by setting the recipient pool to be one unspecified member of the group (i.e., k = 1). Similarly, mul-
ticast can be captured by setting k to m. However, these popular extremes only represent two ends of the
broad spectrum, and, while useful, are not alone sufficient. Consider a sensor network that needs to collect
a statistically significant sample of readings from a group of sensors. Anycasting would clearly be insuf-
ficient, and multicasting to the entire group would be extremely inefficient. In this case, the application
should have the flexibility to specify the target number of nodes to reach, with the network dynamically
responding to meet that specific request.
While the goal of flexible communication opens DTNs to a wide range of new applications, providing
efficient manycast in a DTN environment has many challenges. Along with the standard challenges of all
DTN communication, such as intermittent connectivity, heavy partitioning, high variance in resource con-
straints, and the lack of instantaneous end-to-end paths, manycast has the added difficulty of handling
two new routing parameters, the target group size and the target number of group members to reach,
which can vary with each application request. Additionally, any group-based communication must be in-
tegrated with a group management protocol [37], where knowledge of which nodes are in which groups is
propagated throughout the network. We have previously explored group management with MembersOnly,
described in Chapter 3, which is compatible with our manycast protocol.
To achieve the full potential of manycast in DTNs, it would be beneficial to expose some of these dif-
ficulties to an application in a meaningful way that can guide the application in its decision as how best
to send its data. For example, if the network is relatively well connected, an application may try to reach
more members of a group. To provide this information, it is necessary to understand how “difficult” it
is to achieve manycast, in all of its dimensions, in a DTN. Furthermore, understanding the difficulty of
a manycast request is a necessary first step towards making routing and replication decisions. Unfortu-
nately, almost all of the existing work on DTN routing has exclusively considered unicast. Of the little
work on group-based routing, it has been shown that anycast requires little replication for success [36],
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while multicast requires a lot of replication for success [3]. These preliminary results indicate that there is
a wide variance in difficulty of manycast requests, depending on the application-specified target number of
group members to reach.
The contribution of our research in this chapter can be seen through our three-pronged approach to-
wards the understanding and development of manycast in DTNs. First, we perform an extensive analysis
to increase the theoretical understanding of the fundamental difficulty of achieving manycast in a DTN
environment. By visualizing this space through extensive analysis, we are able to draw conclusions about
the difficulty of anycast, multicast, and all points in-between. One of the most interesting observations is
that loose multicast, where reaching almost all nodes in a group is considered a success, is a substantially
easier paradigm than strict multicast, and should probably be considered a core component of group-based
routing in DTNs. Second, we perform a simulation-based study that incorporates the naturally challeng-
ing DTN environment to understand how these factors, in addition to replication rate, affect the success of
manycast communication. We show that quota-based protocols, where replication is strictly limited, per-
form best when k is relatively small and flooding-based protocols, where replication is not strictly limited,
perform best when k is relatively large. Furthermore, we show that the ideal transition point from quota-
to flooding-based protocols is highly dependent on the environment, in particular the mobility. From this
study, we show that for a manycast protocol to be effective in a DTN environment, it must dynamically
change its routing and replication approach on a per-message basis. Finally, based on our analysis and
simulation results, we develop a DTN manycast meta-protocol that selects the appropriate routing and
replication technique based on the current request and network conditions.
6.2 Manycast in DTNs
Manycast is a very general paradigm that spans the space of single- and group-based communication, giv-
ing applications a high degree of flexibility in their choice of destinations. A manycast request can be de-
fined using two parameters: m and k. The parameter m is the size of the destination group in the request.
This parameter is likely to come from the network itself, or from a distributed group management com-
ponent running on the network [37], as opposed to the actual application. The parameter k is the target
number of nodes to reach in the destination group to satisfy the manycast request. Therefore, an (m, k)
manycast request will be successful if a copy of the message is delivered to at least k of the m nodes in the
destination group. The power of manycast is that it is general enough to include both anycast (i.e., k = 1)
and multicast (i.e., k = m), as well as more traditional routing paradigms such as unicast (i.e., k = m = 1)
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and broadcast (i.e., k = m = n, where n is the number of nodes in the network).
The flexibility of manycast routing opens the door to a rich DTN application space. The inherent sup-
port of anycast and multicast alone brings some degree of flexibility to applications. For example, in a
DTN used in a disaster zone, individuals in need of help can contact any emergency responder instead of
a specific one. Furthermore, it is useful to transmit information such as building blueprints to every emer-
gency response team leader.
However, the true power of manycast lies in the space between anycast and multicast. Building on the
emergency response example, first responders who initially survey a scene may conclude that it is neces-
sary to bring in a certain number of ambulances and/or firefighting vehicles. Manycast would allow these
responders to request k of the m available vehicles, while anycast would be insufficient (only requesting
one) and multicast would be inefficient (requesting all of them). Revisiting the sensor network example
from the previous section, a manycast protocol that could deliver a COLLECT message to at least k of
the m sensor nodes would allow for a statistically significant sample to be reached, without the inefficiency
of reaching all sensors. Another interesting avenue for DTN applications is security. Contacting central-
ized trust authorities is very difficult due to the inherent lack of instantaneous end-to-end paths. Many-
cast would allow an application to contact a subset of distributed CAs, a primitive that is necessary for
threshold cryptography, allowing a more robust form of trust in the network [60]. Even mobile social net-
working applications can benefit from the flexibility offered by manycast protocols. For instance, many
smart-phones and handheld gaming devices have built-in WiFi and Bluetooth, which can be used for mul-
tiplayer gaming when friends are in close proximity. Manycast would enable gaming applications to find k
of one’s local group of m friends to join a game.
To the best of our knowledge, manycast has not been investigated in the context of a DTN environ-
ment. In mobile ad-hoc networks, manycast has been shown to be quite useful [12]. However, in ad-hoc
networks, end-to-end paths are assumed to exist much of the time and manycast can be supported through
the building of partial multicast trees in the network. Such solutions for ad-hoc networks are not directly
applicable to the DTN environment, since there is no expectation of such a high degree of connectivity or
stability. Essentially, multicast or manycast trees will likely have a very short lifetime. Therefore, DTN
manycast protocols must attempt to leverage replication, which does not require knowledge of the exact
route, or even the exact set of nodes, that will receive the message.
Since manycast is a general form of group-based routing, existing work in anycast and multicast for
DTNs is also relevant. As we have shown in the previous chapter, anycast is a highly useful and practical
routing paradigm for DTNs [36]. While anycast has been considered in wired network scenarios [8, 41],
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it has only briefly been explored in DTN environments, where the exploration has been limited to single-
copy routing and/or highly constrained mobility [20, 14]. Multicast, the other extreme of the manycast
paradigm, has only very briefly been considered in DTN environments. In particular, a simulation-based
study that explored how existing protocols handled multicast requests showed that a considerable amount
of redundancy was necessary to reach all group members [3], a somewhat unsurprising result that is fur-
ther confirmed by our work.
In this chapter, we thoroughly explore the general concept of manycast in a DTN environment us-
ing both analysis and simulation. Our results span from anycast to multicast and include all points in-
between. In particular, our work gives insight into how routing and replication techniques must change
from “easy” anycast requests to “hard” multicast requests, and how they can determine where the transi-
tion points are.
6.3 Analysis of Manycast Difficulty
The first step in understanding manycast in a DTN environment is understanding how the difficulty of a
request changes as the parameters k and m change. Since these parameters are highly dynamic, the vari-
ance in difficulty of manycast requests is very high. Determining the difficulty of a request is a necessary
prerequisite to understanding how to best route and replicate the message. For instance, anycast requests
are considered relatively easy, requiring little replication to satisfy [36]. At the other extreme, multicast
requests are considered relatively hard, requiring a lot of replication to satisfy [3]. This section thoroughly
analyzes the difficulty of all requests, precisely quantifying how that difficulty varies with respect to k and
m.
6.3.1 Mathematical Analysis
The fundamental difficulty of a request can be defined in a probabilistic fashion. Given n nodes in the
network, a group size m and a recipient pool size of k, P (m, k) is the probability of satisfying a many-
cast request (m, k). To capture mobility and node contacts, assume a node meets other nodes uniformly
at random, and can expect to meet c nodes per time unit. Furthermore, assume messages expire after t
time units from creation. To enable our mathematical analysis, we assume routing is done via direct de-
livery, where only the source node ever replicates a message, and only does so to deliver the message to
a member of the target group who does not forward it further. This simplistic, but parametrized, system
model is assumed for mathematical analysis only. In Section 6.4, we use a more realistic environment for
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in depth evaluation.
Problem: Given the previously described system model, compute P (m, k), which represents the prob-
ability that a copy of a generated message successfully reaches at least k of the m destination group mem-
bers.
The problem of manycast success is analogous to the following bin-ball problem. Assume there are n
balls labeled 1 through n representing the nodes. Since the sender does not count, n − 1 is more precise,
however this is irrelevant to the computation. Further, assume that balls are picked one at a time, with
equal probability, and the label of the picked ball is recorded. Balls are replaced after each pick. An ex-
perimenter has a total of c · t picks, since this is the total number of non-unique nodes the source node
can expect to meet before the message expires. There is one target group with m members. Assume, with-
out loss of generality, that the destination group members are the first m balls and have the labels 1 to m.
Therefore, after c · t balls have been picked, we want to determine the probability that the experimenter
sees at least k unique balls with labels less than or equal to m.
As a quick example, assume n = 3, ct = 2, k = 2, and m = 2. All possible sets of picks include (1,1),
(1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), (2,3), (3,1), (3,2), (3,3). Since k = 2, of these sets, only (1, 2) and (2, 1) meet the
requirements for success. Therefore, the difficulty of this request, under the described system parameters,
is 29 . As another example, consider n = 4, ct = 3, k = 2, and m = 3. If we work through this case, we
obtain a difficulty of 4264 , demonstrating how fast the space explodes: the number of possible sets is n
m.
Solving the whole problem of determining the probability that after ct picks, one sees at least k labels
less than or equal to m is quite complex. To make the problem more tractable, we divide it into two steps:
(1) given ct, the chance of getting exactly u unique picks (referred to as f(ct, u)), multiplied by (2) given
u unique picks, the chance of seeing at least k values less than or equal to m (referred to as g(u, k,m)).
These two steps are iterated over all reasonable values of u, which range from k, since anything below k
unique picks cannot result in success, to the minimum of n and ct, since the number of unique picks can-
not exceed either the total number of balls or the total number of picks. Therefore, P is defined in terms
of f and g as follows:
P (m, k) =
min(ct,n)∑
u=k
(f(ct, u) · g(u, k,m)).
Recall that f captures the chance of getting exactly u unique values given ct picks. There are two ways
this can occur: (1) the first ct− 1 picks contain the u unique values needed, and so the last pick must be a
duplicate, or (2) the first ct−1 picks contain u−1 unique values, and so the last pick must be unique. Note
that the chance of the last pick being a duplicate if there are already u unique values is u
n
. Similarly, the
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chance of the last pick being unique if there are already u − 1 unique values is 1 − u−1
n
. We can therefore
write f using the recurrence relation
f(ct, u) = f(ct− 1, u) ·
u
n
+ f(ct− 1, u− 1) · (1 −
u− 1
n
).
The initial conditions of the recurrence are as follows. If there are any picks, there must be at least
one unique pick, hence f(ct, 0) = 0. If there is one pick, there must be exactly one unique value, hence
f(1, 1) = 1, and f(1, u) = 0 if u 6= 1.
Next, recall that g captures the chance of seeing at least k values less than or equal to m, given u unique
picks. Seeing at least k values means seeing exactly k values or seeing exactly k+1 values or seeing exactly
k + 2 values, etc, up to seeing exactly m unique values less than or equal to m. We therefore introduce an-
other variable, l, that ranges from k to m, and focus on computing the probability of seeing exactly l val-
ues less than or equal to m. This turns out to be a relatively simple counting problem. We first count the
number of ways to see the l values less than or equal to m, and then count the number of ways to have
the rest of the values greater than m. This is then divided by the total number of possible label combina-
tions. Putting this all together, we define g as follows:
g(u, k,m) =
m∑
l=k
(
m
l
)(
n−m
u−l
)
(
n
u
) .
This completes the definition of P (m, k), representing the difficulty of a manycast request to reach at
least k nodes out of a group of size m. To help visualize the function, we implemented it in MATLAB, as
described in the next subsection.
6.3.2 MATLAB Computation
To explore how manycast difficulty changes with varying request parameters, we implemented P in MAT-
LAB and visualized the results over a wide range of system and user parameters. Memoization was used
to both speed up and cut down on the memory consumption of the recursively defined f function.
The goal of this analysis is to understand how difficult it is for the target number of group members,
k, to receive a message for a group size m. It is also important to understand how this difficulty changes
as one or both of these parameters change. To capture how P varies with varying values of m and k, the
results are presented as 3D graphs. The two control variables are m, which ranges from 1 (e.g., unicast)
to the total number of nodes in the network (e.g., broadcast), and k, which ranges from 1 (e.g., anycast)
to m (e.g., multicast). The z axis represents the probability of success, or P (m, k). All graphs incorpo-
88
Figure 6.1: P (m, k) for 100 Node Network
Figure 6.2: Top-Down View (100 Nodes; 2 Hour Expiration)
rate color to improve the quality of the presentation; however, we will explain how to read the gray-scale
versions.
As a first step, we look at a moderately sized network, n = 100, with reasonable encounter rates, c = 1
per minute, and reasonable message expiration times, t = 2 hours. Starting at k = 1 and increasing to
around k = 23m, there are a relatively large set of values where the success probability is close to 1. Es-
sentially, these requests should be relatively easy to satisfy (see a 3D representation of the success prob-
ability in Figure 6.1). There is then a somewhat narrow transition point where the success rate falls to
values close to 0. This transition point is interesting, since this is where routing techniques may have to
change to provide the more challenging levels of manycast. When k is close to m, there is another rela-
tively large portion with values close to 0, indicating that these requests are relatively difficult to satisfy.
Finally, there is a large zone labeled “Impossible”, where k > m. These requests are impossible to satisfy,
since one cannot deliver a message to k > m group members if there are only m members in the group.
One of the most interesting features of these 3D graphs is the transition from easy to difficult. To bet-
ter compare where these transitions fall, we also present 2D top-down graphs using color to indicate the
Figure 6.3: Top-Down View (100 Nodes; 1 Hour Expiration)
third dimension. These can be thought of as heat maps, where red indicates values closer to 1 and blue
indicates values closer to 0. For example, Figure 6.2 is top-down view of the graph in Figure 6.1. For the
gray-scale versions of these graphs, the upper left portion are the red values close to 1, the dividing lines
are the transitional areas, and the lower right portion are the blue values close to 0.
Two interesting regions are the “slices” where k = 1 (along the y-axis in Figure 6.2), representing any-
cast requests, and k = m (along the diagonal in Figure 6.2), representing multicast requests. As expected,
anycast is close to 1 (red) and so can be satisfied very easily as long as m is not too small, while multicast
is almost always 0 (blue) and so very difficult to satisfy unless m is very small.
Two interesting observations can be made about the transition from high delivery probability (left-red)
to low delivery probability (right-blue). First, the transition happens relatively quickly, as indicated by
the thin white band. This means that if the difficulty of an application’s request is close to the transition
point, it can increase its success drastically if it is willing to decrease k slightly. Second, the transition line
is seemingly linear in nature. This means that if m decreases (e.g., nodes leave the group), then to keep a
similar level of success, k must decrease proportionally. Hence, if the slope of the transition line is known,
applications can adjust their requests accordingly when a group size changes without actually knowing the
exact group size.
Message lifetime obviously has an impact on the success of a manycast request. We evaluate this effect
by using using a message expiration time of 1 hour, essentially reducing c · t by one half. Since nodes now
have a shorter amount of time to deliver messages, this increases the difficulty of all requests. All other
system parameters remain the same. The result is a shift in the transition line, as shown in Figure 6.3.
In essence, changing c or t results in a change in the slope of the transition line. Therefore, some requests
that had a high probability of success changed to having a very low probability of success, indicating that
message expiration time is a critical factor in determining success. Interestingly, the width and linearity
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Figure 6.4: Very Quick Expiration (10 Minutes)
Figure 6.5: Very Quick Expiration (10 Minutes)
of the slope remained relatively unchanged. Since some applications would like to be able to predict the
success probability of a given request within a given lifetime, we can also use these evaluations to find the
minimum value of t, for a given k and m, that would result in a high success probability.
We have looked at manycast in a network with reasonable system parameters. However, it is also inter-
esting to consider how manycast performs with extreme system parameters. Therefore, P has been reeval-
uated for very small and very large values of ct. Consider first a very small value of t, namely 10 minutes
(see Figure 6.4). As expected, the transitional region has shifted very close to the anycast “slice”, indi-
cating that, unless k is quite small, requests in general have a low chance of success. Perhaps more inter-
esting, though, is that the linearity of the transitional region breaks. Instead, it seems more exponential
in nature. This implies that even with a large value of m, k must be small to have a reasonable chance of
success. To better illustrate what is occurring at lower values of m, Figure 6.5 is a rotated version of Fig-
ure 6.4. From this view, it can be seen that even anycast requests (e.g., k = 1) have a very low chance of
success when m is small.
On the other extreme, consider a very large value of t, namely 5 hours. The top-down view of this
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Figure 6.6: Very Long Expiration (5 Hours)
Figure 6.7: 500 Node Network
graph, shown in Figure 6.6, clearly indicates almost all requests can be satisfied with a high degree of cer-
tainty. However, it is interesting to note that multicast requests (e.g., k = m) still have a low probability
of success, particularly when m is large. This further confirms that the multicast paradigm is simply too
hard to satisfy in DTN environments. In fact, as the graph indicates, it is much easier to satisfy “almost
all members of a group” than “all members of the group”. We refer to the almost all paradigm as loose
multicast, and will further show via simulation that loose multicast is substantially easier than strict mul-
ticast.
Finally, to understand the impact of network size, we evaluate a large network of 500 nodes. For this
network, the contact rate is set to 2 nodes per minute and messages expire after 5 hours. The resulting
graph, shown in Figure 6.7, further confirms a linear, thin transition line. As a visual guide, we have in-
cluded solid lines indicating the left and right edges of the transition.
In conclusion, analyzing P for varying values of m and k, as well as with different system parameters,
can lead to many interesting and useful observations. Some of the more prominent ones include: (1) the
clear division of very high and very low probability regions, indicating the need for routing protocols to
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dynamically shift their approach based on the application request and (2) a dramatic increase in success
if the application is willing to relax requests that fall close to the transition line. To gain a better under-
standing of how real protocols in more realistic environments handle manycast requests, the following sec-
tion continues the discussion of the difficulty of manycast in a simulation environment.
6.4 Simulation Study of Manycast
The difficulty analysis presented in the previous section gives insight into the relative difficulty of an (m, k)
manycast request, which in turn provides guidance on routing-level decisions such as replication. This
section incorporates realism into the equation by studying how effective different classes of DTN routing
protocols are and how different types of mobility factor in. For this evaluation, a popular DTN simulator
called the Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator is used [29].
6.4.1 Evaluation Criteria
To gain a broad understanding of manycast performance, two major components are explored: routing
mechanisms and mobility.
Although designed for unicast communication, many of the current unicast protocols use mechanisms
that can support manycast. One of our goals is to understand which routing mechanisms can best be used
for manycast and so can be integrated into our target manycast protocol. Based on the level of replica-
tion used, these mechanisms can be divided into four classes: direct delivery, quota-based, flooding, and
epidemic. Direct delivery is the most basic form of DTN routing, where a node simply carries around mes-
sages it sources until the destinations are directly met. No forwarding ever occurs, and hence this can be
considered the most resource-friendly protocol. Quota-based protocols allow limited forwarding and repli-
cation to improve delivery, but reduce resource usage (e.g., Spray and Wait [51], Spray and Focus [52],
and Encounter-based Routing (EBR) [34]). Essentially, every sourced message contains a quota, which
is a hard limit on the number of replicas of the message allowed in the system. This is enforced by de-
creasing the quota of a message upon replication. Next, flooding-based protocols take advantage of abun-
dantly available in-network storage and are allowed to freely replicate to any or all contacts, without limit
(e.g., Prophet [32], MaxProp [10], and RAPID [4]). These protocols work well in highly disconnected en-
vironments; however, they can quickly overwhelm resources in resource-constrained environments. Finally,
while technically a flooding-based protocol, Epidemic routing [55] attempts to replicate all messages to all
nodes in the network. This is a popular protocol due to the fact that it is optimal, in terms of delivery ra-
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tio and latency, if there are no resource constraints in the network. This protocol can be improved upon
by smart buffer management techniques [45].
To properly evaluate how these protocols handle manycast requests, we choose to implement (or use
existing implementations in the simulator) one protocol per class as a representative of that routing class:
Direct Delivery, Spray and Focus, Prophet, and Epidemic. We also implemented a “group-based” version
of these protocols, where destinations are groups, not individual nodes. We adapted the utility functions
utilized by the protocols to capture group utility instead of node utility. This is done by having members
of the same group “look” like the same node from the perspective of utility functions in the routing proto-
cols. In other words, groups look and act like virtual nodes. We updated the utility functions used in the
routing protocols for a particular group whenever a node meets a group member. The protocol labels in
the results are appended with “-G” to further emphasize this.
The second evaluation criteria is mobility. In our analysis from the previous section, we assumed a
very simple connection model, where a node had an equally likely chance of meeting any other node at
any time. Simulation allows us to understand manycast in a wider range of mobility patterns. There are
two main types of mobility that are critical to the understanding of DTN routing: unstructured mobility
and structured mobility. By unstructured mobility, we mean that there is very little actual structure that
can be extracted from the movement patterns of nodes (i.e., random waypoint and random walk [11]).
Many DTN unicast protocols are analyzed by their performance in these types of unstructured mobility.
For instance, the binary quota distribution technique used by Spray and Wait has been shown to be op-
timal in random mobility [51]. While less realistic, this type of mobility is generally easier to analyze. On
the other hand, structured mobility can be thought of as mobility patterns that generally arise from nodes
that follow different types of movement patterns, possibly related to their environment. For instance, in
a disaster response scenario, emergency responders may be moving towards an event, civilians may be
fleeing from it, and ambulances may be oscillating to and from it [35]. Another example is a community
network, which could be composed of pedestrians, cars, and trams [16]. Structure from these networks
(i.e., popularity) can be extracted and exploited for routing purposes [34, 18]. To explore manycast in
both types of environments, our simulations use both random waypoint as well as the built-in community
model of the ONE simulator.
6.4.2 Simulation Setup
The goal of our simulations is to understand how manycast requests perform under various classes of rout-
ing protocols and various types of DTN environments. Simulations are divided into two main classes re-
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lated to the mobility pattern: unstructured and structured. The unstructured environment is random
waypoint, with each node moving at a speed between 1 and 10 meters per second and waiting at the way-
point for a random period of time between 0 and 2 minutes. The structured environment is the built-
in community mobility model, which places pedestrians, cars, and trams on a real map of Helsinki, Fin-
land. Pedestrians walk at a speed of 0.5 to 1.5 meters per second, cars travel at a speed of 2.7 to 13.9 me-
ters per second, and trams travel at a speed of 7 to 10 meters per second. These nodes follow intuitive
routes to and from local hot-spots. The total map size for the random waypoint mobility model is 3.5km x
3.5km, while the structured mobility model is 4.5km x 3.4km. Within each of these two classes, we explore
how the routers react in small groups (where m = 16) and larger groups (where m = 32). Each graph con-
tains results from each of the aforementioned routing protocols, with the x-axis being the target number
of nodes to reach (k), ranging from 1 (anycast) to m (multicast).
The total number of nodes in each simulation is 126. In the structured mobility model, there are 80
pedestrians, 40 cars, and 6 trams. Each node has a communication range of 100m, transmits at 256kbps,
and has a buffer size of 5MB, except trams which have a communication range of 1000m, transmit at
10Mbps, and have a buffer size of 50MB. Messages are generated randomly by every node every 50 to 70
seconds, with a size randomly chosen between 500kB and 1MB. This setup allows for a somewhat resource-
constrained environment. Each simulation is run for 4000 seconds and each data point is the average of 10
runs and includes a 95% confidence interval.
Simulations are evaluated using both group-based message delivery ratio (MDR) as well as group-
based latency. MDR is defined as the number of successfully completed manycast requests (e.g., the mes-
sage reached at least k of the m nodes) divided by the total number of manycast requests. The Average
MDR is the average of each node’s MDR. Latency, or delay, is defined as the time from message source
until the time that the kth node of the group received the manycast message. Average delay is the aver-
age of all message delays in the network. Note that a message can only have a delay if it was successfully
delivered, and hence this metric should be viewed only in relation to the average MDR. If two protocols
have widely differing average MDRs, then the average delay is less meaningful because intuitively, a high
MDR usually means delivery to hard-to-reach groups. For this reason, we consider average MDR to be the
primary metric of evaluation and the average delay to be the secondary metric of evaluation.
6.4.3 Structured Mobility
We first present results from our structured mobility model, specifically the community mobility model
built into the ONE simulator. Within this class, we first consider a group size of 16. The first major ob-
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Figure 6.8: MDR - Structured Mobility: (a) 16 Node Groups, (b) 32 Node Groups
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Figure 6.9: Delay - Structured Mobility: (a) 16 Node Groups, (b) 32 Node Groups
servation, as seen in Figure 6.8(a), is that no single protocol dominates all values of k in terms of mes-
sage delivery ratio. This result immediately confirms that an efficient manycast protocol must dynamically
shift techniques depending on the individual request. When k < 8, Spray and Focus clearly obtains the
best performance; however, when k > 11, Prophet is superior. Note that the downward slope of Spray
and Focus is greater than both Prophet and Epidemic. This exposes an interesting feature of quota-based
protocols, in that they can be considered more risky than flooding-based ones. Essentially, quota-based
protocols can perform very well when the target number of nodes to meet is relatively small. Limiting the
number of replications keeps resources from being depleted, which can lead to message drops and missed
contact opportunities, yet may still be sufficient for reaching the target number of nodes. On the other
hand, such quota-based protocols perform very poorly when the target number of nodes is relatively large,
since limiting the number of replications does not get the message out quickly enough to a large fraction
of the network.
The results found in Figure 6.8(a) can be broken down further by considering four different regions,
which we refer to as regions A, B, C, and D. Viewing results such as these in terms of discrete regions
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hints at how a dynamic manycast protocol can be developed, which is explored in Section 6.5. We define
region A as the region where Direct Delivery and quota-based protocols are the top performers. It can be
seen that region A includes k = 1 (and hence anycast requests) and k = 2. Region B is defined as the re-
gion where quota-based protocols alone are superior. This region includes values of k from 3 to 9, in this
figure. Region C is defined as the region where quota-based and flooding-based protocols are best. Hence
this can be considered the region where k ranges from 10 to 13. And finally, region D is defined as the re-
gion where flooding-based protocols are dominant over all others. This includes values of k from 14 to 16
(and hence includes multicast requests).
It is important to comment on the behavior of pure epidemic routing. While epidemic routing is con-
sidered optimal when there are no resource constraints, it has been shown many times before that its per-
formance is severely hindered when bandwidth, buffer size, and contact duration are limited [34, 45, 32,
36]. Our results further confirm this behavior for manycast.
When the group size is increased to 32, as shown in Figure 6.8(b), the characteristics of the graph stay
the same. Primarily, the point at which flooding-based protocols overtake quota-based protocols stays in
proportion to the group size. This is actually quite a significant observation since it provides further ev-
idence that to keep the same success ratio, k must be increased proportionally to the increase in m. Re-
call that this behavior was seen as a linear transition line in the MATLAB evaluation. To be clear, in Fig-
ure 6.8(a) (when m = 16), the Spray and Focus MDR crosses the Prophet MDR at around k = 11; in
ratio form, this is 1116 = 0.6875. In Figure 6.8(b) (when m = 32), the two cross at around k = 22; in ratio
form, 2232 = 0.6875. Hence, the crossing point for quota-based and flooding-based protocols seems to occur
in constant proportion to the group size.
Another interesting observation, when m = 32, is the relatively sharp drop-off as k approaches m. This
further confirms the difficulty of multicast in DTNs, and gives support for the theory that applications
willing to relax multicast requests will experience significantly higher success ratios. The relative ranges
covered by regions A, B, C, and D, in relation to the group size, can be considered the same as with m =
16, due to the similar crossing points. Hence region A contains 1 ≤ k ≤ 4, region B contains 5 ≤ k ≤ 18,
region C contains 18 ≤ k ≤ 26, and region D contains 27 ≤ k ≤ 32.
In terms of average delay, it is clear that Direct Delivery is substantially worse than the other proto-
cols for all cases except anycast, where k = 1, as shown in Figures 6.9(a) and 6.9(b). This is because mes-
sages are carried only by the source nodes, and hence the source node itself would have to meet all k of
the target nodes. It is interesting to note that while the resource-friendly property of Direct Delivery can
help its average MDR in resource-constrained environments, it will not help its average delay. Therefore,
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if delay is a critical factor for the application, a Direct Delivery routing protocol would be a poor choice.
Another interesting observation is that, as noted with MDR, the average delay characteristics are similar
between small and large groups. The other three protocols are relatively similar until k gets large. When
k ≈ 23m, Spray and Focus starts to diverge. This reinforces the idea that flooding-based protocols perform
best when k approaches m.
6.4.4 Unstructured Mobility
The second set of results evaluates manycast under unstructured mobility using the random waypoint mo-
bility model. As before, we first present results where group sizes are relatively small, namely 16 nodes. In
contrast to the previous results, Spray and Focus consistently performs at the highest level, as shown in
Figure 6.10(a). This is due to unstructured, random mobility allowing message replicas to spread better
throughout the network [51]. In structured mobility environments, protocols that limit replication have to
deal with the possibility that most of the replicas will stay in a relatively local area. However, in unstruc-
tured, random mobility environments, nodes tend to have a higher degree of mixing. For this same reason,
Direct Delivery also performs at a high rate for a longer period of time. Overall, this leads to the inter-
esting observation that limiting replication is most beneficial to networks whose nodes mix well with one
another. It is also worth noting the relatively sharp drop-off for Spray and Focus and Prophet from k = 15
to k = 16. This illustrates the difficulty of multicast in DTN environments.
In terms of dividing the figure into regions, there is no point where flooding-based protocols are con-
vincingly better than quota-based protocols. Therefore, we can divide the graph into 3 regions, eliminat-
ing region D. Region A includes k = 1 and k = 2, where Direct Delivery and Spray and Focus both per-
form at a high level. Region B includes 3 ≤ k ≤ 14, where Spray and Focus has a clear dominance over
all other protocols. And finally, region C includes k = 15 and k = 16, where Spray and Focus as well as
Prophet perform well.
With a larger group size, namely m = 32, the most interesting feature is the sharp drop-off in MDR
as k approaches m, as seen in Figure 6.10(b) as well as the other MDR figures previously presented. This
common thread indicates that loose multicast, where applications are satisfied if almost all of the group
is reached, will have a much greater chance of success than strict multicast. It is therefore advantageous
for DTN applications to accept and make use of loose multicast if they want to significantly improve their
message delivery ratios. Note that, in our simulations, Epidemic is never superior to Prophet, since Prophet
is better at managing resources efficiently.
To capture the trends, this figure can be divided to four regions, since there is a clear point when flooding-
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Figure 6.10: MDR - Unstructured Mobility: (a) 16 Node Groups, (b) 32 Node Groups
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Figure 6.11: Delay - Unstructured Mobility: (a) 16 Node Groups, (b) 32 Node Groups
based protocols perform best. Region A can be viewed as the region where 1 ≤ k ≤ 3. Region B con-
tains the region where 3 ≤ k ≤ 24. Region C can be defined as 25 ≤ k ≤ 29. Finally, region D includes
30 ≤ k ≤ 32.
The average delay trends of the protocols in the unstructured environment are similar to that of struc-
tured environments. As seen in Figures 6.11(a) and 6.11(b), Direct Delivery incurs the largest average
delay by far for all cases except anycast. All of the protocols have a somewhat linear trend until k ap-
proaches m. Prophet, Epidemic, and Spray and Focus all quickly increase as k approaches m, with Spray
and Focus being the most pronounced. This further emphasizes the difficulty of multicast requests, and
strongly suggests that applications consider loose multicast.
6.5 A Manycast Meta-Protocol
Given the trends exposed in our evaluation, it is clear that no one protocol mechanism performs best all
of the time. Therefore, a successful manycast solution for DTNs should be dynamic and change replica-
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tion techniques per request as necessary to achieve the best performance. In this section, we present a dis-
cussion of general guidelines that can be used for handling requests, and build a manycast meta-protocol
framework based on the observations from the previous sections. Essentially, the goal of this meta-protocol
is to select a protocol from the appropriate replication class that maximizes the average message delivery
ratio. This can be thought of as “staying on top of the curve”.
There are three main factors to consider when deciding whether to use no replication, little replication,
or a lot of replication. Additionally, these factors change with every distinct request, and hence must be
re-evaluated per request. The first factor is the target number of nodes, k, of the request. If k is small,
less replication is necessary to achieve success. If k is large, more replication is necessary. The second fac-
tor is the network and group characteristics. If the mobility of the network is structured or nodes do not
mix evenly, then quota-based protocols may have a harder time properly distributing replicas. In this
case, more replication may be necessary. On the other hand, if the mobility of the network is unstruc-
tured, where nodes mix relatively evenly, quota-based protocols are sufficient in many cases. Furthermore,
the group size of the request’s destination group will influence the decision. While not directly explored in
this chapter, resources such as battery life also fall into the “network characteristics” property. If battery
life is a major constraint, then less replication is desirable. The third factor is the application’s tolerance
to delay. This factor is dependent on the request and, hence, will change per request. If low delay is im-
portant, then Direct Delivery should never be favored.
Using these observations, a general framework for routing manycast requests can be constructed. Re-
call from Section 6.4 that the network and group characteristics, the second factor in our previous discus-
sion, can be used to break the range of k into four regions. If k falls in region A, Direct Delivery or quota-
based protocols can be used. If k falls in region B, quota-based protocols alone are superior. If k falls in
region C, quota-based or flooding-based protocols can be used. And if k falls in region D, flooding-based
protocols are preferred. Therefore, the meta-protocol will take the following steps:
1. Divide the k range into four regions based on the network and group characteristics: A, B, C, and D
(note that some regions may be empty, such as region D as shown in Figure 6.10(a))
2. If the request is time-sensitive, eliminate region A, and extend region B to cover it
3. Consider the target number of nodes, k, and determine which region the request falls in
4. Select a routing protocol from the appropriate class based on the region
In a more algorithmic form, a general skeleton for the dynamic manycast protocol can be seen in Algo-
rithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic Manycast Meta-Protocol
m← size(request.destGroup)
regions← getRegions(networkState,m)
if request.timeSensity then
regions.B = regions.B ∪ regions.A
regions.A = EMPTY
end if
reg = whichRegion(regions, request.k)
if reg == A then
protocol = selectFromClass(DD ∪QUOTA)
else if reg == B then
protocol = selectFromClass(QUOTA)
else if reg == C then
protocol = selectFromClass(QUOTA∪ FLOODING)
else if reg == D then
protocol = selectFromClass(FLOODING)
end if
return protocol
This algorithm can help a node decide which low-level protocol to use for routing a specific request.
The algorithm should be run only at the source node. Any intermediate nodes simply route the message
based on the protocol originally selected by the source node. Therefore, the overall process would be as
follows. First, an application generates a manycast request. The meta-routing protocol at the source se-
lects a low-level routing protocol to use for the request. Finally, the network routes the request, using the
low-level protocol originally decided on by the source meta-routing protocol.
6.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this chapter, we have explored the concept of manycast routing, where an application desires to reach
at least k of m members of a group, where m is the group size. This very general paradigm inherently in-
corporates more specific group-based paradigms such as anycast and multicast. Through thorough analy-
sis and simulation, we have quantified the difficulty of manycast requests in relation to one another, and
illustrated the need for a dynamic manycast protocol that changes techniques on a per request basis. Uti-
lizing these discoveries, we demonstrated a practical approach to manycast routing by using a meta-protocol
to appropriately select a low-level routing protocol based on network factors and the specific request.
There are many interesting future directions in regards to group-based communication and manycast.
First, it would be interesting to understand how different DTN protocols interact with each other while
running simultaneously. Our results from this chapter show that a dynamic manycast protocol is neces-
sary to change the replication rate on a per packet basis. Taking this a step further, one could thoroughly
explore how the replication decisions from one request affect the delivery rate and other metrics of sub-
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sequent requests; in other words, explore the interplay between requests that are routed using different
routing techniques. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to extend our results to include resources such as
battery life, which will force a new trade-off regarding replication. Finally, an implementation of our meta-
protocol, and its subsequent exploration on a live testbed such as DieselNet [62] would be a necessary step
towards practical deployment.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Directions
Human-centric DTNs are critical to supporting communication in environments where infrastructure can-
not be, or should not be, relied on. As mobile devices become more ubiquitous, we expect the potential
for multi-hop communication through these devices to be high. However, the lack of efficient unicast and
group-based communication hinders their wide-spread use. In this thesis, we have identified and contributed
to five components that will help facilitate the adoption of human-centric DTNs. In particular, we have
shown that by taking advantage of the structure inherently found in these networks, traditional forms of
communication can be efficiently performed in DTNs, and new group-based communication can be practi-
cally realized. First, we introduced two tools that help us understand and lay the foundation for advanced
routing protocols. These include a high-level mobility model for disaster recovery networks and a local
and robust group management system, capable of distributing group information accurately, even in un-
trustworthy environments. Second, we progressed the state-of-the-art in DTN routing by proposing three
routing protocols and techniques to allow for efficient and effective unicast, anycast, and manycast.
In this thesis, we have presented five components that together progress the state-of-the-art in DTN
communication. In addition to the individual future directions presented at the end of each chapter, there
are many general future directions that affect all of the components. We now identify and briefly discuss
three prominent ones: (1) evaluation of these protocols, and others, working together in the same environ-
ment, (2) merging together DTN protocols to more connected environments, and (3) implementation of
the components.
First, future DTNs will likely have multiple routing paradigms, such as unicast and manycast, as well
as multiple routing protocols within the same paradigm, operating simultaneously. Hence, individual pro-
tocols should work cooperatively to achieve maximum performance. Since common resources, such as stor-
age and bandwidth, are limited in human-centric DTNs, these protocols should be aware of current re-
source levels and adjust their replication rates accordingly. Techniques from Thompson et al. [54] present
a first approach on monitoring local resource availability, and merging these ideas into the protocols pre-
sented in this thesis would allow for a more cooperative environment.
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Second, with the prominent increase in mobile, wireless devices, it is almost a certainty that future
environments will include highly connected and highly disconnected nodes in the same network. There-
fore, techniques to bridge DTN protocols with MANET routing protocols [44, 28, 2], particularly those
that make use of in-network storage such as CNF [42], are a necessity. An initial investigation into this
topic was presented by Ott et al. [39], where DTN was used to extend AODV functionality. While this is
a good first step, future protocols must take into account the numerous challenges associated with hybrid
networks, such as varying link quality, vastly different levels of connectivity, and devices having multiple
network attachment points.
Third, the components presented in this thesis have been designed and evaluated using analysis and
simulation. It would be very useful to implement some of these components, particularly MembersOnly
and the routing protocols. Implementation would allow us to more thoroughly evaluate the characteristics
of the protocols, and could be done using software routing techniques such as CLICK [30] and XORP [59].
With the recent increase in wireless and DTN testbeds, such as ORBIT [46] and DieselNet [62], the proto-
col implementations would allow for much more realistic characterizations than simulation can give. The
ultimate goal would be for the protocols presented in this thesis to have production-level code associated
with them, and can hence be deployed.
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